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INTRODUCTION
Allowing an Internet shopper, who is a regular customer of a web
site, to complete her selected purchase without having to click a
confirmatory button indicating she really meant to buy it may hardly
seem like something a well-functioning patent office should have
found appropriate for patent protection in 1997. 1
 Yet, a federal court
issued a preliminary injunction to enforce such a patent against Bar-
nesandnoble.com
 during the 1999 Christmas season, requiring cus-
tomers to make two or more clicks to complete purchases on that
site—a potential annoyance to them and a cause of lost revenue for
the company. 2
 Although the preliminary injunction was eventually
vacated on appeal based on the questionable validity of the patent in
l But see U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) (entitled 'Method and Sys-
tem for Placing a Purchase Order via a Communications Network," listing Jeff Bezos and
others as inventors and assigned to Amazon.com , Inc., which covers what is colloquially
called "one-click shopping," the application for which was filed on September 12, 1997).
2 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249 (W.A.
Wash. 1999) (granting motion for preliminary injunction on December 1), vacated and
remanded by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
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view of the prior art, 3 the defendant's litigation costs to obtain this
result could not have been minor. 4
The threat of cases like this has prompted the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division to ask in
their announcement of joint hearings on such issues:
To what extent do questions about the scope and types of
patents (e.g., business methods patents), and the procedures
and criteria under which they are issued, raise competition is-
sues? To what extent do substantive and procedural rules,
both at agency and judicial levels, have implications for initial
and sequential innovation, competition, and appropriability? 5
The hearings that followed this announcement spanned most of 2001,
during which many critics of the patent system argued that the system
may be in steep decline due to an increase in the number of patents
issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the "Patent Office")
that these critics suggest do not meet the proper patentability stan-
dards and, as a result, are too broad or too narrow, unduly tax and
retard negotiations, or frustrate competitions
s Amazon.com, Inc. v Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1342, 1366 (2001) (vacat-
ing and remanding because of "substantial questions as to the validity of the '411 patent").
4
 The published order of the trial court lists thirteen different attorneys on the side of
the defendant. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. The case was filed on October 21, 1999,
and the preliminary injunction was entered roughly seven weeks later, after expedited
discovery including depositions and five days of oral arguments. Given the emergent need
to handle so many tasks in such a case, it fairly may be assumed that the listed attorneys
were billing most, say two-thirds, of their time on the case while working most of the time,
say twelve-hour days six days a week. At a blended rate of $250 per hour, this suggests the
total legal fees through the entry of the preliminary injunction were over one million dol-
lars ($1,092,000). The fees through the appeal are likely to have been at least another one
million dollars, based on similar calculations. See Am. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N,
REPORT or ECONOMICS SURVEY 2001, at 88-89 tb1.22 (2001) (reporting the median total
cost of litigation including discovery, motion practice, trial, and appeal to be $1.5 million
or $2.9 million, depending upon whether the amount at stake in the lawsuit was either
from $1—$25 million or greater than $25 million).
5 Notice of Public Hearings Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in
the Knowledge-Based Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146, 58,147 (Nov. 20, 2001) (announcing
joint hearings and explaining the reasons for them); see also Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, Muris Announces Plans for Intellectual Property Hearings (Nov. 15, 2001)
(collecting sources, including links to Federal Register Notice and to speech by Chairman
Timothy Muris, and questioning these and other aspects of the patent system),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/11/iprelease.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
6
 For a schedule of the hearings including participants and topics, see http://www.
ftc.gov/opp/intellect/detailsandparticipants.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). For a collec-
tion of academic and popular literature making these criticisms, see Mark A. Lemley, Ra-
tional Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001).
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Although a ratcheting up of the screening done in the first in-
stance by the Patent Office, to achieve a more "hard-look" examina-
tion, is an intuitive and often-urged response, this Article makes the
counterintuitive suggestion that instead, the Patent Office should do a
"soft-look" examination, if any examination at all. 7 This Article focuses
on a comparative analysis because the question any evaluator must
Although many see only broad scope as a potential problem because the patent right
to exclude may be seen as extending too far, others see a couple of problems associated
with narrowness. First, the work by Rebecca Eisenberg and others points out how too many
patents of too narrow scope can be seen to unduly tax and retard transactions. See Arti
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 126-29 (1999) (suggesting that patents on multiple gene fragments,
such as expressed sequence tags, could block the use of a larger DNA sequence of which
they are a part, and citing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticoinmons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (arguing
that patents can deter innovation in the field of basic biological research)), This argument
and its implications are explored in depth in the other important works by Eisenberg. See
generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1017 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Experimental Use) (ex-
ploring an experimental use exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviat-
ing potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic
biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Property Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech-
nology Research, 97 YALE. L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Norms of Science] (explor-
ing potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic bio-
logical research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Public Research] (offering preliminary observations about the empirical record
of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research and recommending a retreat
from present government policies of promoting patents in that field). But see F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to
Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 691, 699-700 (2001) (showing why a patent claim di-
rected to a gene fragment like an expressed sequence tag ("EST") cannot be construed to
cover a larger DNA sequence, such as a substantial portion of an entire gene); John P.
Walsh et al., Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation 1 (2002)
(working paper, available online at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/retrievePDF?
id=2003-2) (report of empirical research finding little in the way of anticommons prob-
lems with biotech research tools). Second, the work by Robin Jacob and others point out
how claims of narrow scope may be enforced in ways that avoid significant antitrust scru-
tiny. Robin Jacob, Side Bar: Objectionable Narrowness of Claim, in DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG
A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN, & F. SCOIT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PAT-
ENT LAW 1097-99 (2d ed. 2001) (providing examples and collecting sources of early ar-
guments supporting pro-competitive aspects of narrow claims).
7 The "hard-look" and "soft-look" terminology refers to the level of scrutiny given a
patent upon filing. Although at least some patents should get a hard look at some point,
this Article shows how the social costs associated with providing a hard look through civil
litigation are expected to be less, especially when accompanied by the other important
features of the patent system discussed infra in Part IV
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always ask is not whether any one system has negative aspects, but
rather how it compares to alternatives. 8
To best understand the intuition behind soft-look systems gener-
ally, this Article offers as a model a hypothetical alternative system
under which patent applications are registered, not examined. 9 Study
of this model reveals both how the social costs associated with hard-
look examination systems are especially large and how the costs asso-
ciated with soft-look systems—such as the present system and the
model registration system—are especially small."
In focusing on social cost, this Article offers a new normative ac-
count of the positive law rules for obtaining patents." The registra-
tion theory offered in this Article shows how the essential patentabil-
ity rules mitigate significant social costs and how existing normative
views of the patent system fail to account for these social costs. 12 Far
from defending the present patent system, this Article offers a num-
ber of significant modifications expected to mitigate social costs fur-
ther by embracing, somewhat counterintuitively, the admittedly ex-
pensive tools of commercial litigation."
In the final analysis, the prescriptive conclusions this Article
reaches are somewhat modest." Although the conclusions of this Ar-
ticle are limited in part because they are likely to turn on empirical
determinations and balancing that cannot be done responsibly with-
out further data, this Article does provide a new and practicable
framework for making such evaluations." In addition, although we
already may be operating under a de facto soft-look system, at least in
many respects, this Article offers several reforms designed to bring
the present system more in line with soft-look systems like the pro-
posed registration model." Furthermore, the conclusions drawn here
8 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Ecoht. 1, 1
(1969) (critiquing so-called nirvana approaches in favor of comparative institutional ap-
proaches).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Parts 111-111.
13 The Article thereby builds on earlier work by the present author that offers a nor-
mative account of the rules for enforcing patents. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. Rev. 697 (2001).
12 See infra Parts I—N.
Is See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part IV.
It As discussed "isifria in Parts I—IV, the registration theory's ease of implementation is
one of the theory's important comparative benefits over other theories of the patent sys-
tem, such as the "prospect" and "rent dissipation" theories.
113 Sec infra Part IV.
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may be influenced by our broader views on the comparative strengths
of different decision-making regimes, such as between those that are
centralized and those that are individualized and dispersed, and be-
tween those based on rules and those based on standards." Regard-
less of the prescriptive value any of this Article's conclusions may have
for positive patent law directly, this Article's unique elucidation of a
normative account of the patent-obtaining rules as operating to
minimize certain social costs will help commentators and policymak-
ers evaluate other proposed reforms in the future. 18
This Article proceeds in four, parts as follows: Part I reviews the
existing normative theories of the patent system and shows how they
fail to offer practicable approaches for a positive law regime and fail
to minimize social costs. 19
 Part II explores the case for an alternative
hypothetical model of a registration system and shows how social costs
can be minimized by use of such a system." Part III reviews the law
and economics of the core patent-obtaining rules and shows how the
registration theory is superior to other normative theories, both in
ability to be implemented and in ability to account for the patent-
obtaining rules in the present system. 21
 Part IV compares the pure
17 For a discussion of the broader debate between legal systems based on rules and
those based on standards, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRITICAL LEGAL STUD-
IES 15-63 (1987) (describing basic framework of the debate and collecting sources); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring the
costs implicated by the choice between rules and standards and showing: rules typically are
more costly than standards to create; standards typically are more costly for individuals to
interpret, both by individuals deciding how to act under them and by government deci-
sionmakers deciding how to apply them; and individuals are more likely to act in accor-
dance with the goals of rules as long as the individuals can determine how they will be ap-
plied); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79
OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (reviewing more recent literature and collecting sources). Compare
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988) (arguing that private
bargaining over the allocation of the legal entitlement may be more efficient if the entitle-
ment is clearly defined and assigned ex ante according to a rule, rather than made ex post
by a judge applying a standard), with Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus
Standards, 11 J.L. EcoN. R ORG. 256, 256-59 (1995) (showing how parties may negotiate
with each other under both types of regimes and arguing that in certain two-party cases,
bargaining may be more efficient under a standard than tinder a rule).
18 As discussed infra Parts	 the registration theory's explanatory power for the pres-
ent patent system is another of the theory's important comparative benefits over other theo-
ries of the patent system, such as the "reward," "prospect," and "rent dissipation" theories.
19 See infra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
2°
 See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 85-222 and accompanying text.
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registration model to the present system and then offers some pro-
posed reforms to the present system.22
I. CONTEXT WITHIN THE PATENT LAW & ECONOMICS LITERATURE
Prevailing normative views of the patent system fail to account for
significant social costs that are mitigated by many of the present pat-
entability rules. 28
 Although the prevailing views do provide important
lessons about how the patent system can mitigate certain social costs,
they fail to show, in any practical way, how to mitigate others, or bow
to mitigate social cost overall. More specifically, they fail to address
important issues such as how to evaluate an invention, either to de-
termine its entitlement to some patent or other reward, or to deter-
mine its relative entitlement when compared with other inventions. 24
These issues turn out not to be small administrative matters.28 The
normative view offered in this Article shows how the present patent
system has evolved essential tools for making these determinations in
ways that mitigate social cost.26
The patent system in this country has generally been seen as of-
fering inventors an incentive to do something they might not other-
wise do—for example, , invent, disclose, commercialize, or design
around. 27 These incentives are generated by the grant in each patent
of the right to exclude others from doing whatever is covered by the
patent's claims.28 Recognizing that discrete incentives like these, fo-
cused on inventors, could be provided directly without the output-
22
 See infra notes 223-291 and accompanying text.
26 See infra Part III, elucidating the law and economics of the core patent-obtaining
rules and showing how the registration theory dominates other normative theories both in
ability to be implemented and in ability to account for the patent-obtaining rules in the
present system.
24 See infin notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
26 See infra Part III, showing how these issues are addressed by the present patent-
obtaining rules.
26 Sec infra Part In.
27 For a review of the literature and a collection of sources, see Gummi ET AL., supra
note 6, at 58-90 (reviewing various incentive theories for the patent system) and Eisen-
berg, Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1024-46 (same).
28
 Patents give only a right to exclude use of whatever product or process is covered by
the patent's claim or claims. Thus, for example, patents do not interfere with other gov-
ernmental efforts to restrict use, such as to mitigate environmental impact. See F. Scott
Kieff, Patiatifor'EnviinnineritalistS; 9 WAsit.'11. J.L. & PoL'v 307,308 (2002) (invited sympo-
sium piece for National Association of Environmental Law Societies annual meeting enti-
tled "Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future," held March 15-17,2002, at Washing-
ton University School of Law) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994) ("Every patent shall
contain ... a grant to the patentee ... of the right to exclude others ....")).
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restricting effects of the patent right to exclude, commentators have
for over a century explored alternative ways to provide these incen-
tives using tools such as cash rewards and tax credits. 29
In his 1977 piece on the so-called prospect theory of the patent
system, which builds upon work by Yoram Barzel and others, Edmund
Kitch showed how granting formal property rights, as opposed to cash
rewards, is important for avoiding the social costs associated with rac-
ing towards a common prize." Called rent dissipation by Mark Grady
and Jay Alexander in 1992,31
 the racing problem can be demonstrated
by the example of an uncoordinated group of individuals who are
each seeking a prize of known value. Each such individual might ra-
tionally elect to spend up to just less than the value of the prize to get
it, meaning that as a group they are spending more in aggregate than
the value of the prize. 32
29 Generally, prizes or rewards are thought to offer two main benefits over patents: (1)
they do not confer power over price; and (2) they can be made later in time, after the
demand curves are knowable, so a more precise calculation of the social benefit of the
invention can be determined and then used when setting the reward amount. For a de-
tailed review of the history and modern iterations of prize proposals, including a new im-
provement thereon, see generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAN D. L.
REV. 115 (2003) (collecting sources and arguing for the establishment of an agency to
distribute a fund for rewarding corporate efforts to reduce the monopoly effects of patent
rights). Determining how to administer rewards in the real world is a central problem the
commercialization theory identifies in reward proposals, as well as any reward-based the-
ory of patents. See Kieft', supra note 11, at 712-17 (discussing this problem in the context of
the screening advantages of patents over rewards). Reward approaches and theories usu-
ally assume a one-to-one relationship between inventions and markets that can drastically
deviate from reality—consider that the typical car or computer sold in a single market
comprises a huge bundle of patent and other intellectual property rights. In addition,
reward approaches do not elucidate how to determine what should be rewarded and how
to allocate rewards among claimants.
3° Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
265-67 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT.
348 (1968)).
3 ' Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
305-10 (1992).
32
 Consider a case in which the value of the prize is Xand the group of individuals is Y
in number. Each individual might rationally elect to spend up to just less than X to obtain .
the prize, say some amount equal to X minus a small discount, say 8, or (X-8). Yet, if all
individuals spend that amount, then the community has spent the amount equal to [(X-8)
x 11 to obtain something worth only X. The following mathematical representation will be
true as long as Xand 1' are numbers greater than one and 8 is a number less than one:
[(.8) x 11 > Y
This means that the amount society spent to obtain the prize is greater than the
amount society got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste of resources. To be sure,
whether each individual would rationally elect to spend up to just less than Xdepends on a
number of factors. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 232 (1989); Terry L.
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Although rent dissipation can be a problem in theory, recent
work by Michael Abramowitz adroitly points out a number of factors
that may mitigate rent dissipation effects in practice." These factors
include risk aversion; opportunity costs; diversity among those racing;
the time it takes to get the reward; and externalized costs or benefits
those racing impose on others, such as the income to those who sell
goods and services needed by those racing or the costs to those who
are bothered by the activities associated with racing. 34
In addition, rent dissipation presumes there is a single prize, or
at least a discrete number of prizes." But those attempting to solve a
problem may not arrive at the same solution; they may get to different
solutions and there may be even more solutions available.36 Although
multiple solutions to a given problem may be wasteful when the good
is not really needed, which is an interesting possibility explored at
Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement ►, 50 S. ECON. J. 438,
441, 447 (1983). For a somewhat similar critique of the rent dissipation theory, see A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 267, 284-85 (1996).
" MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, COPYRIGHT REDUNDANCY 10-18 (George Mason Sch. of
Law, Law & Econ., Working Paper Series 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract_id=374580 (collecting sources and showing how each of these factors may operate
to mitigate rent dissipation effects).
" Id. at 11-12. A more palpable, albeit mythological, example of these positive exter-
nalities of racing might include the joy children experience when they drink the Tang®
and use the Velcro® that many think were brought to society through the NASA-sponsored
space race; the corresponding negative externalities might include the cavities some chil-
dren get from increased exposure to this sugared drink and their difficulty tying knots
after growing up with shoes kept on by hook-and-loop fasteners instead of laces. See, e.g., A,
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs,
72 NEB. L. REV. 351, 378 n.95 (1993):
The creation of "spin off" inventions has often been urged as one of the
benefits of government-funded research. See George J. Howick, The NASA
Technology Utilization Program, in UtIlLIZING R & D BY-PRODUCTS 69, 78-82
( Jerome W Blood ed., 1967) (describing NASA program and examples of
spin-off inventions, including inorganic paint, walking wheel chair, mainte-
nance-free lubricated bearings, and sight-controlled switches). Some other
examples of commercial products arising out of the space program include,
smoke detectors, graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and hang
gliders, but not velcro, teflon or tang.
" Although it is often useful when modeling a problem to reduce it to a manageable
form to construct the model, the single-solution element of the rent-seeking models can-
not be extrapolated to provide meaningful guidance for policymakers without at least con-
sideration of whether in the real world the set of possible solutions to a given problem
(prizes) is limited, and whether we are nearing such a limit.
36 see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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some length by Abramowicz,37
 when the utility of the good is substan-
tial, the benefits of multiple solutions may dominate. 38
 That is, al-
though more may not always be better, it also may not always be
worse. Consider the multiple, independently patentable and non-
infringing solutions to the problem of pain and inflammation: aspi-
rin, acetaminophen (Tylenol®), ibuprofen (Advil®, Motrin® ), selective
COX-2 inhibitors (Vioxx®
 and Celebrex®), and various steroids."
Some patients can only take some of these drugs, and some patients
can take all, but not at all times. In the real world we cannot know ex
ante whether more solutions are going to be redundant, or whether
they will both increase consumer choice and provide access to more
consumers who could not consume the earlier solutions. 4°
An additional problem with the prospect and rent dissipation
theories is that they present themselves with the very problem they at-
tempt to solve. As Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith pointed out
" ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 33, at 2-9. Interestingly, the fair use defense and the utility
exception to copyrightable subject matter may combine to leave uses that are needed ef-
fectively beyond the enforceable reach of any valid copyright rights.
" An increase in the number of available solutions will increase the chance of each
person gaining access to any one solution. This is one reason why the patent system does
not require the claimed invention to be "better" than the prior art, only new and nonobvi-
Gus, As then judge Warren Burger wrote, quoting Judge Giles Rich:
Progress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich the art
as well as those who improve it. Even though their inventions are not as good
as what really exists, such inventors are not being rewarded for standing still
or for retrogressing, but for having invented something. The system is not
concerned with the individual inventor's progress but only with what is hap-
pening to technology.
Comm'r of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656,667 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Burger, j.) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L, Rev. 393,
393,402 (1960), reprinted in NONOBVIOUSNESS —THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABIL-
ITY 2:L 2:9 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (admonishing that we must avoid "the unsound
notion that to be patentable an invention must be better than the prior art.").
" It is not always the case that an independently patentable invention will avoid in-
fringement of earlier patents. Patentability of the second invention turns on a very differ-
ent set of questions than its possible infringement of the first patent. The patentability
analysis of the second invention will turn largely on the scope of information in the art at
the time that invention is sought to be patented, which includes the disclosure in the first
patent. For more on the rules of patentability over the prior art, see CHISUM ET AL., supra
note 6, at 323-706 (treatise and casebook teaching and collecting sources). The possible
analysis of infringement of the first patent by the second invention will turn on the claims
of the first patent. For more on the rules of patent infringement, see id. at 829-1041.
In areas where we can make good judgments ex ante about which avenues of re:
search are most likely to be productive, it may be possible to fund the work prospectively.
The government grant-making processes such as those at NIH and NSF basically operate
this way by empanelling experts in the field to review grant applications.
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soon after Kitch, the more effective the patent is in coordinating activi-
ties of those in the industry after the patent has issued,'" the greater will
be the problems of racing towards the patent application before
filing . 42 Kitch's response was to argue that the coordination costs are
likely to be low in such early stages because there are likely to be only a
small number of players then." But this response does not fully answer
the problem. As Abramowicz correctly points out, the transaction costs
may be high in such a community because the members may have
significant cognitive biases.'" The transaction costs to coordinating may
also be high if the racers do not know about each other. 45
But the central limitation of the rent dissipation and prospect
theories is that they do not offer a way to use the social cost lessons of
prospecting to design legal rules for obtaining patents that can oper-
ate ex ante to mitigate the social costs of prospecting. Instead, Kitch
argues that the prospect theory explains why the commercial success
associated with a patented invention should be an important factor in
determining whether it is patentable."
Similarly, the rent dissipation theory urges a finely tuned patent
system that will grant and enforce patents only when the balance of
these pre-patent and post-patent racing costs tips just the right way. 47
But the rent dissipation theory does not provide a framework for mak-
ing such determinations ex ante, at the time a private party would de-
41 Kitch, supra note 30, at 276.
42 Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects. and Economic Surplus: A
Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197,202-03 (1980).
45 Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & ECON.
205,205-06 (1980).
44 Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 184 n.251 (collecting sources on cognitive biases of
overconfidence and overoptimism).
45 They may not know each other because the field may be so new that the community of
people working in it is not defined. Or, the potential members of the community may gener-
ally be known, but without the freedom to divulge their work to each other that is given by a
patent, they may not know enough about each other to coordinate. This latter type of coor-
dination problem is known generally as the Arrow Information Paradox. See Kenneth J. Ar-
row, Economic We/fare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RA-rt AN DIRECTION
OF INvErrtivt Amway 609,616-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
46 Kitch, supra note 30, at 282-83 (discussing commercial success). Later in the same
work, Kitch may be advocating that the test for patentability over the prior art should
merely be novelty, without nonobviousness. See id. at 284 ("Thus substantial novelty is an
economically rational test of patentability."). Such an argument would accord with the
social cost saving benefits of the registration theory outlined here. See infra Part III.A.
47 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, at 322-47 (offering a complicated method for
making patentability determinations using a host of factors, many of which are determined
long after a patent application is filed, such as the importance of the patent in controlling
downstream rent-dissipating effects).
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tide whether to file a patent application or at the time the Patent
Office would examine it. Instead, it only identifies a select few re-
ported judicial decisions that, according to the summary accounts of
Grady and Alexander, turn out to be ex post examples of results that
may have avoided rent dissipation. 48
In the final analysis, at least to date, the prospect and rent dissi-
pation theories provide important insights about how the patent sys-
tem can both increase and decrease rent dissipation-type social costs.
But the theories do not offer a tool for comparing these costs against
other social costs, assessing net social costs, or doing all of this in a
way that would work for making patentability determinations in a
timely fashion.°
The importance of being able to make determinations about pat-
entability and patent scope around the time of the application has been
emphasized recently in a number of areas of the literature. R. Polk
Wagner, in his work on the patent infringement doctrine called the
"doctrine of equivalents," elucidates the importance of information-
forcing penalty default rules as inducement to potential patentees to
produce socially valuable information early in the life of the patent."
In addition, Clarissa Long, in her work on the often overlooked signal-
ing function of patents, shows how in certain circumstances the infor-
mation-signaling function of patents may be even more valuable to the
rights holder than the substantive rights conferred by patent law."
Id. at 343-47 (discussing only a few cases in summary). Furthermore, one of the few
cases Grady and Alexander rely upon as illustrative of the rent dissipation theory, General
Mills v. Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967), does not accord with any of the prevail-
ing trends in the case law over time. An electronic search using the Westlaw° KeyCite
service did not reveal a single case after 1974 that cited Pillsbury on this issue and further
revealed that, if anything, the case is miscited by a commentator as announcing a per se
rule against patents in the field of culinary arts. See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property
Protection for the Creative Chef, or How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1477, 1482 n.30 (1991) ("Food items are patentable, but the culinary creativity of
chefs is not the type of creativity which meets the standards for patentability.").
49 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
" R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 161-67 (2002) (arguing for a shift in focus from the allocation of
liability during infringement (ex post) towards rules that generate incentives both during
and before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) so as to better understand information-
forcing default penalty rules like the limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as
the "doctrine of prosecution history estoppel," which holds out the possibility of lost pat-
ent scope as an inducement to potential patentees to produce socially valuable informa-
tion early in the life of the patent.).
51 Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L REV. 625, 625-28 (2002) (exploring the sig-
naling function of patents generally, including the potential role of the patent document
itself to convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts).
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Similarly, my own earlier work on the commercialization the-
ory of patents shows how the patent right to exclude operates, as
designed, at the time after inventions are made to help bring such
nascent inventions to market through the process called commer-
cialization. 52 According to this view, patents allow patentees, and
the many others with whom they must negotiate, to achieve com-
mercialization by allowing them to internalize the full benefits of
the subject matter claimed, in keeping with the work by Harold
Demsetz on the emergence of property rights generally." Also ac-
cording to this view, determinations about the property right must
be made early in the commercialization process for that process to
52 Kieff, supra note 11, at 707-10 (explaining how the right to exclude use promotes
commercialization by facilitating the social ordering and bargaining around inventions
that are necessary to generate output in the form of information about the invention, a
product of the invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention).
53 Indeed, in addition to the administrability or screening problem discussed supra
note 29, another central problem the commercialization theory identifies in the reward
theories is the failure of rewards to achieve commercialization. Id. at 717-18, 727-41 (dis-
cussing Harold Demsetz, Tbward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Ass. ECON. REV. 347 (1967),
and Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)).
The commercialization theory may resemble some aspects of the prospect theory. See id. at
707 n.47 ("The incentive to commercialize theory discussed herein is similar in some re-
spects to the 'prospect' theory elucidated by Kitch, which views the patent as important in
providing incentives for investment in increasing the value of a patented technology.")
(citing Kitch, supra note 30, at 276-77). But Kitch focused on Barzel's work and on coor-
dination as a tool to decrease pre-patent and post-patent rent-seeking, or what can be
viewed as overuse of certain resources. Sec Kitch, supra note 30, at 265 (citing Barzel, supra
note 30). In contradistinction, commercialization focuses on Demsetz's work and on coor-
dination as a tool to prevent the underuse of certain resources. Kieff, supra note 11, at
717-18, 727-41 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz). Although the earlier literature does
suggest some correlation between these works of Kitch and Demsetz, it merely collects
them together, without elucidating their interrelationships and differences. See, e.g., Julie
E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97
Micu. L. REV. 462, 497 n.121 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and noting: ''Similar reason-
ing underlies Edmund [(itch's proposed 'prospect' approach to patents."); Eisenberg,
Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1040 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: "The
prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in keeping with broader theories of
property rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz ...."); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 309 n.108 (1996) (citing work by Kitch and
Demsetz and noting: For neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about creat-
ing an artificial scarcity in intellectual creations than about managing the real scarcity in
the other resources that may be employed in using, developing, and marketing intellectual
creations."); Rai, supra note 6, at 121 n.236 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz but seeing
the underuse problem as "not readily apparent in the context of intellectual property"). At
bottom, whereas the prospect theory can be seen to focus on coordination among compet-
ing users of an invention, the commercialization theory can be seen to focus on coordina-
tion among complementary users.
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occur." Indeed, as pointed out in this earlier work, the desire to
help the commercialization of inventions was a central motivating
factor behind the present patent system, which remains largely
based on the 1952 Patent Act. 55
To be sure, the commercialization view of the patent system, as
elucidated thus far, may not be without its problems. First, as
Abramowicz exhaustively explores in at least two of his present projects,
there may be ways to modify the patent right to exclude so that com-
mercialization is still achieved, while at the same time minimizing po-
tential output-restricting effects of the strong right to exclude." Sec-
ond, as Abramowicz also points out, the commercialization view may be
both over- and under-inclusive.57
 Stated differently, the commercializa-
tion view as discussed thus far does not fully explain, for example, why
the patent system does not afford protection to help commercialize
technologies that do not meet the tests for patentability, such as novelty,
but nevertheless are not being commercialized presently."
54
 This is because the property right is not serving a reward function or a simple cost-
subsidization function but rather is serving a coordination function. Kieff, supra note 11, at
712 ("Thus, as compared with a reward system, the patent system may be not only better
able to improve coordination among market players engaged in the invention commer-
cialization process, it also may be better able to avoid, rent dissipation.") (citing generally
Grady & Alexander, supra note 31).
55 Id. at 736-46 (showing how the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act were motivated by
the commercialization theory).
Abramowicz offers some important add-on tools for the patent system that would
take the core rules for obtaining and enforcing patents as given, but at some point during
the patent term buy out the patent right through a carefully crafted system to ensure the
right price is paid. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 115-27; see also Michael Abramowitz,
The Human Gnome Project in Retrospect, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 231, 249-60 (2003) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON PROPER-
TIES) (describing and assessing a retrospective grant system).
57 See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 174. I also thank participants in the Spring 2001
Workshop Series of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago Law School for raising a similar objection. My response to both begins with a re-
minder of the brief discussion of the screening function in the paper on which they were
commenting, see Kieft, supra note 11, at 712-17, and continues with the registration theory
presented in this Article.
58
 These might be technologies that have been forgotten, that never managed to draw
sufficient coordinated interest to have been commercialized, or have been commercialized
only outside of this country. Indeed, although so-called "patents of importation" were
available for inventions not previously commercialized in the realm in England and in the
colonies before the country was established, they essentially have not been allowed in this
country since its inception. Sce generally Edward C. Walterscheid. Novelty in Historical Perspec-
tive (pts. 1-2), 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 689, 777 (1993) (discussing history of
the novelty provision in the U.S. patent system at the time of framing). The law and eco-
nomics of the novelty provisions in the present patent system, including the treatment of
foreign activity as prior art, are discussed infra Part 1111.A.1.
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The commercialization view does offer at least an implicit answer
to this problem when it points out the screening role played by com-
petitors of the patentee with the help of a court, a role which would
have to be played by government decisionmakers under a reward sys-
tern.59 Under the commercialization view, the competitors of the pat-
entee are provided with incentives to bring information about a pat-
ent's validity to the attention of a decisionmaker.° Accordingly, the
Barnesandnoble.com case discussed at the beginning of this Article°
represents one example of the screening function contemplated by
the commercialization view, albeit at a cost that is not insignificant 62
Although the admittedly significant cost of screening patents
through civil litigation presents a serious obstacle to any theory that
embraces a soft-look approach, especially registration, these costs must
be compared against the costs of allocating or screening patents using
other approaches.63 As shown more fully below, by exploring the hypo-
thetical model registration system, the registration theory offers com-
paratively practicable and inexpensive tools for screening patents." The
B9 Kieff, supra note 11, at 712-17.
60 Id. It appears that Kitch also may have noticed this feature of the patent system in
his reply to McFetridge and Smith:
A patent system is a grant system with the clever feature that it generates pri-
vate incentives for those with comparative advantage in the innovating activity
to reveal the information necessary to define the prospect right. Without this
incentive, the granting agency would have to determine the appropriate
scope and technological area of the prospect rights with access only to its own
information.
Kitch, supra note 43, at 207 n.5. What is not clear from this text is whether "private parties"
refers to patentees, the patentees' competitors, or both. As explained in more detail infra
in Part III, each of these players in the patent system plays a crucial role in making sure the
patent claim scope is "just right" in a way that minimizes social costs.
Bi See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
62 See supra note 4 (showing representative costs).
BB See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing importance of comparative
analysis). The advantages of screening under a soft-look approach, which were identified
by the commercialization theory, bring into question the role of the Patent Office in a way
that provides the impetus for the registration theory explored here. See supra notes 58-62
and accompanying text (citing Kieff, supra note 11, at 712-17). Thus, the registration the-
ory can be seen as a companion to, or application of, the broader commercialization the-
ory, which motivated the framing of the present patent system. See supra note 52 (summa-
rizing commercialization theory).
" See infra Part II for discussion of the registration model itself and infra Parts III-1V
for application of the model to our present patent system, including proposed reforms.
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registration theory's emphasis on the notice aspect of the patent system
is in keeping with contemporary theory of property rights, generally. 65
II. THE REGISTRATION MODEL
Many patent critics would begin their reform efforts by ratchet-
ing up the level of scrutiny given to patent applications during Patent
Office examination to avoid the social costs due to those patents that
ultimately would be adjudicated invalid through federal court litiga-
tion." The registration model, explored more fully below, shows that
the level of scrutiny the Patent Office gives patent applications should
be ratcheted down, because the cost of thorough examination would
be higher than the costs of federal court litigation. 67
The hypothetical model patent system differs from our present
one in that patent applications would be merely registered in the Pat-
ent Office rather than examined." Under the present system, patent
applications are filed in the Patent Office and examined for compli-
ance with the legal rules for patentability by technically and legally
trained staff of that administrative agency." Under the examination
65
 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-70 (2000) (discussing informa-
tion-cost theory of property).
66
 For sources, see supra note 5 and Lemley, supra note 6, at 1495 n.l.
67 See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing costs of providing and
evaluating the information needed to determine validity over the prior art).
66
 This involves a shift to a soft-look approach that is counter to the suggested shifts in
the literature. For sources arguing for harder look, see supra note 5 and Lemley, supra note
6, at 1495 n.l.
66
 The extent to which the Patent Office is like other administrative agencies, and
therefore subject to the body of administrative law, has been a topic of substantial debate
over the past several years in the literature and in the case law. Compare, e.g., Orin S. Kerr,
Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 127, 127-33 (2000)
(arguing that administrative law doctrines should not apply to patent law), with Craig Allen
Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 passim (1995) (arguing
that administrative law doctrines such as "Chevron deference" should be applied to Patent
Office decisions). Also compare Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding
that contrary to almost a century of practice, the Administrative Procedures Act's standard-
of-review provisions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 do apply to factual determinations of the
Patent Office), with Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated the following:
As we have previously held, the broadest of the [Patent Officers rulemaking
powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regu-
lations directed only to the conduct of proceedings in the [Patent Office];" it
does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules. Be-
cause Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive
rulemaking power, the "Final Determination" at issue in this case cannot pos-
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process, also called patent prosecution, the ex parte exchange between
the applicant and the Patent Office examiner typically lasts about three
years before an application that has not been either finally rejected or
abandoned issues as a patent." Having been examined, issued patents
enjoy a procedural and substantive presumption of validity, and a party
challenging a patent must prove invalidity under the heightened stan-
dard for civil litigation of "clear and convincing evidence." 71
In the proposed registration model, patent applications would be
filed with the Patent Office but not examined. The Patent Office would
maintain original files and make authentic copies available publicly,
perhaps via the web for free, as is clone with the EDGAR system for secu-
rities filings at the Securities and Exchange Commission." In addition,
the presumption of validity would be eliminated, or at least relaxed,
thereby allowing invalidity to be judged under the standard ordinarily
used in civil litigation of "a preponderance of the evidence."'"
Recent work by Mark Lemley sheds some light on the strengths
of soft-look systems---such as the present system and the proposed
registration model—as compared with hard-look systems in which
patents are examined with stricter scrutiny. 74 Lemley shows that
H[b] ecause so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is
sibly have the "force and effect of law." Thus, the rule of controlling defer-
ence set forth in Chevron does not apply.
(footnotes and internal citations omitted) (holding that the Patent Office is not entitled to
the deference given other administrative agencies, which are vested with sufficient power
by Congress, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, USA. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)),
" See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL., sitpra note 6, at 91-128 (describing examination procedures
under present system).
71 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (presumption of validity).
72 Sec SEC Filings & Forms (EDGAR), at http://www.sec ,gov/edgar.shtml (last visited
Nov. 13, 2003). As described on the front SEC web page about EDGAR:
All companies, foreign and domestic, are required to file registration state-
. ments, periodic reports, and other forms electronically through EDGAR.
Anyone can access and download this information for free. Here you'll find
links to a complete list of filings available through EDGAR and instructions
for searching the EDGAR database,
id. A modest filing fee, say $1,000, might also be used to fund the operation, and to pro-
vide some disincentive against the filing of complete junk. Indeed, regular maintenance
fees might also be required. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renew-
able Copyright, 70 U. Cut. L. REV. 471, 472-75 (2003) (suggesting modest filing and main.
tenance fees as an efficient tool for managing a system of copyright registration and poten-
tially infinite copyright term).
73 Cf. supra note 71 (citing higher presumption of validity under current system).
44 See generally Lemley, supra note 6.
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much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in
those few cases than to invest additional resources examining patents
that will never be heard from again. "75
Lemley explores one important reason why the making of de-
tailed validity determinations in litigation instead of in the Patent
Office leads to lower net costs across all patents when he offers the
core insight that litigation and its threat operate to provide important
information about society's level of interest in a given patent—only
those patents that matter receive a hard look. 76 But this information
could be provided through other means, perhaps.even directly to the
Patent Office, which leaves open the issue of which method of provid-
ing this information is cheapest. 77
A more complete exploration of this open issue is therefore re-
quired to understand the many reasons why the costs of providing
such information through litigation are less. 78
 One advantage of liti-
gation is that, because it comes later, it allows more information about
society's interest in the patent to accrue, thereby decreasing the like-
lihood of error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which pat-
ents should receive close attention. 79
 Another advantage is that ex
post selection of those patents that turn out to matter raises fewer
administrative and public choice problems than would ex ante efforts
because the attention of both proponents and opponents of a given
patent are more likely to be at a peak in later litigation. 80
 Decision
75 Id. at 1497. Merges also makes this argument in Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,594-96 (1999).
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497 (deriving its essential insight from the little-
acknowledged fact that the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even
licensed).
77
 The screening function identified by the commercialization theory suggests the reg-
istration approach offered here. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing
genesis of registration theory). For a discussion of strategies for bringing this information
to the Patent Office, instead of to courts, see the discussion infra Part IV.D of systems that
employ strategies that are soft-look/hard-look hybrids through various post-issuance pro-
cedures before the Patent Office.
78
 This is the focus of the registration theory, as discussed throughout this Article. For
a discussion of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules of the present system
and why they make sense under the registration theory because they are cheap to enforce,
see infra Part 111. For a discussion of potential improvements that may further decrease
social costs, see infra Part IV.
78
 This is essentially the Lemley insight. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497.
80
 A central problem explored in the public choice literature is ensuring the proper
timing of decision making so that those most interested will be able to have their views
counted. To be sure, this analysis must be seen against the background of the extensive
literature on public choice theory. For collections of views and sources, see generally PER-
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making through litigation mitigates many of the well-known problems
associated with making award-type decisions.m
This Article makes a radical departure from prior work in the
field by showing how, on an individual-patent basis, the costs of pro-
viding the information needed to decide validity and the costs of
"correct" adjudication with that information are likely to be lower if
these determinations are made in litigation than if they are made in
patent examination. 82 The intuition for this view is that the informa-
tion relating to validity in litigated cases is rarely in the hands of the
government but, rather, is often obtainable by, or in the hands of, a
private party who experiences a strong incentive to bring that infor-
mation to the attention of a court.° As discussed more fully below,
SPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); MUELLER, supra note 32; MAX-
WELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement,
74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Dwight It. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 191 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Thritsaction Costs and the NormativeElentents of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988). •
A related concern from the law and economic literature on patents is the importance
of being able to know ex ante or at least early in the life of a patent whether the patent will
be valid. Sec supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of ex
ante approaches). But see supra note 56 (discussing the importance of ex post approaches
in Abramowicz's work on retrospective spending).
81 See Kieff, supra note 11, at 713-14 & n.77 (citing LEO KATZ, ILL-GoTrEN GAINS: EVA-
SION. BLACKMAIL, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996) and discussing the prob-
lems with allocating cash rewards, tax credits, or any other kind of kudos in comparison to
those with allocating patents and showing why systems of cash rewards or tax credits would
be poor substitutes for a patent system).
52 Whereas the Lemley insight looks to the aggregate cost across all patents, and points
out that most patents turn out not to matter, see Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497, the insight
provided in this Article looks at the cost for each patent that turns out to matter. For a
discussion of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules when applied to any one
patent, see infra Part III. These two insights may be combined to reveal the benefits of
many of the proposed reforms discussed infra Parts IV.C—E.
8s Kieff, supra note 11, at 712-14 (discussing the role of a patentee's competitors in po-
licing the patent system by searching out and bringing to bear the best information re-
garding a patent's validity).
A somewhat similar tool for bringing to bear this information is the bounty system
proposed in John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 limn/. ILL. L, REV. 305, 340-53, But such bounty systems may not be
net improvements. They may provide some help in cases where the validity-destroying
information is in the hands of someone other than the party seeking to invalidate the pat-
ent. But they may not be needed and raise further problems. To the extent the person
having the information is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, then that person is sub-
ject to the courts' subpoena power and can be compelled, to produce documents, testi-
mony, or other evidence once uncovered by the party seeking to invalidate the patent. The
creation of a side market for these people to "sell" their information will frustrate the op-
eration of the present systems that courts have developed for obtaining such information
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this information is more cheaply obtained, provided, and evaluated by
private parties, including the patentee and competitors of the pat-
entee, than by the government. 84
THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF PATENT-OBTAINING RULES
The benefits of soft-look patent systems, like either the present sys-
tem or the proposed registration model, can be seen through the below
law and economic analysis of present patent-obtaining rules. Each ma-
through third-party discovery. To the extent third-party witness compensation practices are
considered so stingy that they provide a disincentive to these people, they can be made
more flush through modest amendment to the rules of procedure in such cases.
An alternative approach is the effort to create higher incentives for the patent appli-
cant to bring this information to bear during the patent examination process in the first
instance as suggested in Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 767-70, 787-97 (2002) (building upon and citing the fee-shifting
techniques presented in the early working paper version of this Article, see F. Scott Kieff,
Comments Regarding Competition & Intellectual Properly, Summary of Proposed Testimony, at 12-
13, at hup://wwwitc.govios/comments/intetpropertycomrnents/harvardlaw.pdf (2001)
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003); infra text accompanying notes 280-282, but arguing that they
should be used to provide an incentive for the patent applicant to better inform the patent
examination process, which differs from the argument presented here in that it adheres to
the orthodoxy of advocating methods for improving hard-look examination systems and
eschews soft-look approaches like those explored in this work), and SHUBIIA GHOSH &JAY
KESAN, WHAT Do PATENTS PURCHASE? IN SEARCH OF OPTIMAL IGNORANCE IN THE PATENT
OFFICE 2-5 (Unit of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper Series No. LEOS-
007, 2003), at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=410545
 (arguing that Patent
Office examination of patent applications, especially better informed examination, is im-
portant in making issued patents more valuable as the objects of licensing deals). But, as
discussed infra Part III.A, the rules relating to patent validity are, and should be, responsive
to information that happens to be not known or easily knowable by the patent applicant.
As a result, heaping added incentives to find this information on the back of the patent
applicant is not likely to be an efficient tool for bringing this information to the attention
of decisionmakers. For other bounty approaches, see Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better
Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents 7-9 (2003) (working paper, avail-
able online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=431242)
 (suggesting cash rewards be granted to
those who successfully defeat the validity of a patent).
Yet another approach is to alter the framework for appellate review of patent cases, as
explored in the recent important work by Rai. See generally Aim K. RAI, FACT, Law, AND
POLICY: AN ALLOCATION-OF-POWERS APPROACH TO PATENT SYSTEM REFORM (Univ. of Pa.,
Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 02-20, 2003), available at http://ssrti.com/ab-
stract_id=335122
 (advocating change in the appellate review process).
B4
 See infra part III.A (reviewing patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior art, which
turn out to be triggered by information that is in the hands of the specific parties the rules
are designed to protect, not in the hands of the government). Merges makes a somewhat
related point about the advantages private parties have over courts in evaluating informa-
tion in patent cases in Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
CoLum. L. REV. 2655, 2664-65 (1994) (discussing private parties' informational advantage
in negotiating over an intellectual property right, which will be based at least in part on
the subsidiary question of that right's validity).
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jor statutory requirement for patentability is studied, and its social-cost-
minimizing qualities elucidated.° Seen through this lens, otherwise
puzzling aspects of the patent system appear for the first time to fit
within a coherent normative framework, under which the positive law
rules for obtaining patents operate primarily to minimize social cost.°
Not only does the registration theory depart from existing litera-
ture by accounting for the patent-obtaining rules, it also focuses on the
verifiable claims of both a patent applicant and its competitors, instead
of primarily on those of the applicant. 87
 That is, rather than first asking
what scope of protection a patent applicant "deserves," 88 the registra-
tion theory begins with the presumption that the patentee is entitled to
the largest scope of protection that does not actually infringe the free-
dom from patent protection that some competitor of the patentee can
claim legitimately to "deserve," and provides a framework for judging
this type of desert.° In putting the burden on the competitor to justify
freedom from the patent, this approach potentially leaves a patentee
with what might be viewed as overly broad protection.° But the theory
also saddles the patentee with a strong incentive not to seek "too broad"
86 The rules are shown to practicably protect investment-backed expectations and fa-
cilitate ordering around protected territories. See infra Parts III.A—.A.3.
88
 The registration theory has explanatory power for the intricacies of these rules,
which are not well explained by other law and economic theories of the patent system, like
the prospect and rent dissipation theories. Those theories merely point out rent-seeking
concerns that are implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex post determinations be
made about which patents turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-seeking type of so-
cial cost, See supra notes 30-49.
8/ In contradistinction, the claims of the patentee are the focus of so-called "reward"
theories discussed infra notes 105-108.
88
 Other law and economics theorists have tried to align the benefit a patent confers
on the patentee on the one hand with the benefit an invention confers on society on the
other hand. See, e.g., MICHAEL KItEMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAG-
ING INNOVATION passim (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6304,1997),
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6304 (discussing ways to improve the match between
social surplus of the invention and the amount an inventor will recoup); STEVEN SHAVELL
& TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS passim (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6956, 1999), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w6956 (same).
89
 The registration theory focuses on those claims that are verifiable, which turns out
also to have strong explanatory power for the intricacies of the patent-obtaining rules re-
lating to the prior art. See infra Part III.A. The more basic question of whether we should
even elect to inject a patent system into the otherwise freer market is explored generally
supra Part I, and the more specific case for a system of patents as property rights enforced
by property rules is discussed in my.earlier work on the commercialization theory as re-
viewed supra notes 11,52-55.
" See supra note 6 (providing sources of criticism).
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protection and instead to get the scope "just right" 91 Under this view, as
discussed more fully below, the patent-obtaining rules are comparatively
easy-to-administer tools that operate, in the case of the prior art rules, to
protect prior investment by third parties and patentees and, in the case
of the disclosure rules, to facilitate their future investment. 92
A. The Prior Art Rules Inexpensively Protect Investment
Patent law's rules regarding the prior art—the § 102 93 and § 10394
requirements that a patentable invention be novel and nonobvious-
protect the investment-backed expectations of both the patentee and
its competitors, and they do so in ways that involve remarkably few
administrative costs." As discussed more fully below, the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements protect the investment-backed expecta-
tions of those other than the patentee by ensuring that a patent right
to exclude will not extend to anything those in the art are doing al-
ready or are about to do." As also discussed more fully below, the one-
year grace period of the statutory bar protects the investment-backed
expectations of the patentee.97
As Robert Nozick recognized in his watershed libertarian work on
the minimalist state, it is because of patent law's prior art rules that
the patent system does not run afoul of the Lockean proviso that
property rights should leave enough in society's commons for those
other than the property holder. 98
 Patent law achieves this effect by
91 The problem of getting patent scope "just right" has long dominated the literature.
See generally Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6 (arguing for limited scope to protect
competition rather than facilitate coordination); Grady & Alexander, supra note 31 (offer-
ing rent dissipation theory to show how scope can be adjusted to control rent dissipation
in both upstream and downstream research efforts); Kitch, supra note 30 (offering pros-
pect theory to show how broad scope controls rent dissipation in downstream research
efforts); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 11x. L.
REv. 989,1000-05 (1997) (exploring economic impacts of scope); Robert P. Merges, Intel-
karat' Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 'TNN.E L. REV.
75 (1994) (same); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economies of Patent
Scope, 90 Cotum. L. REV. 839 (1990) (same). For a discussion of the patentee's incentives
to get scope "just right," see infra Part 111.C.
" See infra Parts III.A—B.
95 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)' (novelty and statutory bars); see also infra Part 111A.1.
-" Id. § 103 (nonobviousness); see also infra Part 111.A.2.
95 See infra Parts DIA.1-2 (discussing how these rules account for verifiable investments).
" For a discussion of how the rules on novelty and nonobviousness protect these in-
vestments, see infra notes 127-139,154-182 and accompanying text.
97 For a discussion of the grace period, see infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
Rommr Nozicit, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 182 (1974) (noting that a patent
does not deprive others of anything because, but for the act of inventing, the process or
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making sure that valid patents leave others free to do whatever they
otherwise were doing. 99
The registration theory goes further than the libertarian realiza-
tion that patent law can have this minimal effect on the freedom of
those other than the patentee by suggesting that this effect should not
be merely a consequence of the patent system, but a goa1. 19° The reg-
istration theory also adds the goal of achieving this effect with the
lowest administrative cost possible.'" Once these two relatively modest
goals are envisioned, substantial light is shed on the justification and
operation of the many otherwise complex positive law rules patent
law has evolved for determining what counts as being in the prior art
and what preclusive effects it will have on a patent claim. 192 Other
patent theories fail to provide any explanation for core patent-
obtaining rules about the prior art, fail to offer their own workable
rules, or yield perverse results.'"
Many patent theories try to answer the skeptical question raised ,
about patents by one of the country's first luminaries to write about
them. Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State oversaw the ad-
ministration of the country's first patent system,'" felt it important to
thing invented would not be in use); see also JoisN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government
§ 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690) (property rights are only justified 'where there is enough, and as good
left in the common for others"). The philosophy of intellectual property is a broad topic
with its own literature. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 passim (1993)
(exploring the case for the public's property interest in being free from intellectual prop-
erty rights); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 296-330
(1988) (exploring the case for property rights in intellectual property using the Lockean
labor approach); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values
in Intellectual Property, 68 C111,-KENT L. REV. 841 passim (1993) (exploring potential liberty
restraints associated with intellectual property rights).
99 NOZ1CK, supra note 98, at 182.
100 This goal is different from the goals of preventing rent-seeking or giving a reward,
which are the goals of the prospect, rent dissipation, and reward theories offered by oth-
ers. Compare supra notes 30-49 (discussing prospect and rent dissipation theories), with
infra notes 105-108 (discussing reward theories).
101 The prospect, rent dissipation, and reward theories fail to offer any easy way to im-
plement their goals. Compare supra notes 30-49 (discussing prospect and rent dissipation
theories), with infra notes 105-108 (discussing reward theories).
102 See infra Parts	 (discussing operation of these rules).
I" See supra notes 46-49 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not offer workable
rules); supra note 81, infra notes 106-108 (reward theories do not offer workable rules either).
I" President George Washington signed the Patent Act of 1790 into law on April 10,
1790. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. See KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE
PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE 21-22 (1994) (reviewing history of the
Patent Office and collecting sources).
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ask whether each invention was in the first instance 'worth to the pub-
lic the embarrassment of an exclusive patent."'" But any such theory
that tries to tie the legitimacy of a patent to the nature of the invention
faces a number of remarkably difficult problems.'" Theories tied to the
merit of the invention face the conceptual problems of requiring some
preliminary determination of how to judge merit in any practicable
fashion. 107
 They also turn out to have faced serious practical problems
concerning their application, as courts applying these approaches
tended to avoid finding that any invention met the standard.'"
i°5
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in JEF-
FERSON WRITINGS 1286, 1292 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Interestingly, Jefferson's
views on patent issues may have been taken substantially out of context by many, including
the Supreme Court:
M here is nothing whatever to indicate that the views held by Jefferson were
those of the Framers themselves or those of either the first federal Congresses
or the early federal judiciary, or, for that matter, the general populace. In this
regard, the Graham Court completely ignored the rejection by the second
federal Congress of Jefferson's proposal that a good defense to infringement
should be that the invention is so unimportant and obvious that it ought not
to be the basis of an exclusive right."
Edward C. Walterscheid, °Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Patent Power, 9J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 325 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (collect-
ing sources) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966) (consolidated with
Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co.) and com-
panion to United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)).
1°B
 Theories like this are generally referred to as "incentive-to-invent" or "reward"
theories. Sec generally supra notes 27, 81 (collecting sources that review these theories and
their pitfalls).
1 °7
 The conceptual problems generally involve a mismatch between any particular
metric of merit and our impressionistic view of the "right" result. For example, if the met-
ric were hard work, then accidental inventions would not be patentable. If the metric were
value of the invention to society, then determinations cannot be made ex ante. The many
conceptual problems associated with measuring rewards are discussed in the sources cited
supra note 81.
08
 By the late 1940s, courts would only allow a patent on an invention that they de-
termined met the self-referential standard of "invention," a test that had become so overly
robust that Justice Robert Jackson criticized its application in a 1949 dissent: "the only
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on." Jorgen-
sen v. Ostby 8: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Giles
S. Rich, Congressional Intent—at; Who Wrote the Patent Act of 19521, in PATENT PROCUREMENT
AND EXPLOITATION (Southwestern Legal Found, ed., 1963), reprinted in NONOBVIOUS-
NESS -THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTARILiTY, supra note 38, at 1:1, 1:3 (discussing
history of the nonobviousness requirement, and its use as a replacement for the require-
ment of invention); George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the
Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437 passim (1999) (same). Even
after the requirement for "invention" was statutorily replaced by the 1952 Patent Act's
requirement for nonobviousness in § 103, some courts continued to apply a standard re-
markably similar to the one criticized by Justice Jackson. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar
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Some other patent theories suggest that the patent-obtaining
rules should be adjusted to be sensitive to complex economic factors,
like rent dissipation. 109 But some of these, like the prospect theory,
fail to offer concrete rules usable ex ante to make determinations of
patentability and instead just offer general guidelines, such as that
patent claims can be better if broader."° Others, like the rent dissipa-
tion theory, offer the perverse recommendation that an invention
that is so far beyond the prior art that it is "optimal" should not be
patentable under the prior art rules because a patent would both
cause too much rent dissipation among those seeking the patent and
not be needed to prevent rent dissipation among those who otherwise
would race to improve upon it. 111
In contradistinction, the registration theory views the prior art
rules as designed to achieve the more modest goals of protecting in-
vestment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence,
which is an approach that is both workable and has explanatory
power for the present system.'" The registration theory begins from a
The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, supra note 6, at 30, 30-31
(former Patent Office Commissioner Mosshighoff explaining importance of creating the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 to bring uniformity to the applica-
tion of patent law and avoid the results in some circuits, as discussed during the
confirmation hearings for then-Second Circuit judge Thurgood Marshall's nomination to
the Supreme Court when he responded to a question about patents by saying "I haven't
given patents much thought, Senator, because I'm from the Second Circuit and as you
know we don't uphold patents in the Second Circuit"). Patent theories like these are more
about the absence of patents than about how or why we want patents to operate.
105
 The prospect and rent dissipation theories discussed earlier are two prime exam-
ples. See supra Part I. The commercialization theory also discussed earlier differs from
these two theories in viewing the coordination effects of the patent not as a way to prevent
rent-seeking or rent-dissipating behavior but only as a way to facilitate the industrial or-
ganization activities necessary to get the public to enjoy some benefit from a nascent in-
vention. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The modest roles for the positive
law prior art rules that are contemplated in the registration theory discussed here are en-
tirely compatible with the commercialization theory and its views on the screening func-
tion played by competitors of the patentee. Sec supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
110 See supra Part I; see also Kitch, supra note 30, at 267-71 (discussing importance of
broad claims early after initial discovery).
111 Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, at 346 ("By definition, an optimal proportion
cannot be improved upon; rent dissipation theory, therefore, predicts patent nonen-
forcement."). In part, the rent dissipation theory seems to be assuming that something
may actually be "optimal" or '`good" in a way that assumes a great deal. Most importantly, it
seems to implicitly subscribe to some type of nirvana thesis, which is generally shunned in
the literature because no example has been offered of any human endeavor that is in all
respects "optimal." See supra note 8 (critiquing nirvana approaches).
1 " Compare supra notes 46-49 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not offer
workable rules), with supra note 81, and infra notes 106-108 (reward theories do not offer
workable rules either).
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presumption in favor of holding inventions to be patentable over the
prior art unless some verifiable evidence of sufficient reliance is
shown.us Under this view, the system should have a novelty require-
ment to protect those investments that have matured into actual
technical activities)" Similarly, the system should have something like
a nonobviousness requirement to protect those investments that are
about to mature into actual technical activities)" For both require-
ments, the system should consider only those investments that
verifiably existed before those of the one claiming a patent right)"
The registration theory has great explanatory power for the prior
art rules)" The theory's presumption in favor of not holding an in-
vention unpatentable over the prior art explains the often-overlooked
introductory language to the statutory prior art provisions, which sets
forth that "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless' any of the
conditions subsequently provided in the statute is triggered) 18 In-
deed, the registration theory also explains the otherwise controversial
statutory language that provides such a minimal role for the Patent
Office. 119
 In addition, present patent-obtaining prior art rules have
been considered by many, including me, to be "a statutory mine field
113
 Unlike the theories that focus on determining which claims to a patent are worth
protecting, the registration theory focuses on determining which claims to freedom from
patent are worth protecting.
114 See infra Part III.A.1.
115 See infra Part IILA.2.
113 See infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (discussing how dates are compared).
" 7
 See infra Parts IILA.1-4 (discussing the rules).
118
 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). The many subsections of § 102, subsections (a) through
(g), then set forth the categories of things that can count as prior art. Any single piece of
prior art, sometimes also called a "reference," will count as prior art for purposes of both
the novelty and statutory bar analyses of § 102 and the nonobviousness analysis of § 103 if
it is determined to trigger any one, or more than one, of the subsections of § 102. Ciiisum
ET AL., supra note 6, at 554; see also In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 984-90 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (over-
ruling In re Palmquist, 319 F.2d 547 (C.C.P.A. 1963) to hold that despite plain meaning of
the statute, art qualifying only under § 102(b) may support an analysis under § 103). For
the reasons discussed more thoroughly by Parchomovsky and Lichtman et al., the result in
Foster is important to mitigate the costs associated with strategic disclosure. See generally
Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175
(2000); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000).
119 See supra note 69 (citing Merck Sc Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that because "the broadest of the [Patent Office's] rulemaking powers-35
U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to
the conduct of proceedings in the [Patent Office];' it does not grant the Commissioner
the authority" needed to in turn entitle the Patent Office to the deference given other
administrative agencies, which are vested with sufficient power by Congress, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
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through which patent applicants must navigate." 120 With the benefit of
the registration theory, they can be seen as the expected intricacies of a
system rationally designed to consider all verifiable investments. 121
What is more, the registration theory's look to these prior art
rules as being triggered by relatively simple fact questions into the ex-
istence or nonexistence of specific things or events reveals why it
makes sense for patent validity determinations to be made by the
same ordinary civil judges and juries that decide other cases. Deter-
minations about what people verifiably have done or are about to do
implicate surprisingly simple questions of fact that do not require
special technological training or judgment, and therefore are well
suited for adjudication by lay juries and judges. 122
1. Novelty and Bar
The patent system's patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior
art begin with those in § 102 of the statute, which relate to novelty and
bar. 123 "Anticipation by the prior art" is the phrase in patent law used
120 See, e.g., Cittsum ET AL., SUM note 6, at 323.
121 See infra Parts III.A.1-4. What is more, in accordance with the registration theory's
goal of improving efforts to protect investments, many of these rules worked their way into
our regime over time even though they were not all present at the outset. See generally PJ.
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, in TITLE 35, UNITED STATES ConE ANNoTATEn
1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC . Y 161 (1993) (reviewing his-
tory and operation of our present patent system, which is largely based on the 1952 Patent
Act); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Ever Evolving Meaning of Prior Art (pts. 1-3, 4-6, 7-8, &
pt. 9), 64 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 457, 571, 632 (1982), 651 PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 3, 477, 658 (1983), 661 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 479, 573 (1984), 671
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 33 (1985) (reviewing in detail the evolution of many of the
prior art provisions that exist since the 1952 Patent Act and collecting sources); Walter-
scheid, supra note 58 (reviewing the first roughly 100 years of the prior art provisions with
particular focus on the rules relating to derivation and foreign use).
122 F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex Technological
Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES, supra note 56, at
471, 473. Such a positive view of lay juries in patent cases marks a somewhat counterintui-
tive departure from most of the other work in this field, including earlier work of my own.
See, e.g., S. Leslie Misrock and F. Scott Kieff, Latent Cures for Patent Pathology: Do Our
Civil Juries Promote Science and the Useful Arts?, presentation at The Crisis of Science
and the Law, Science in Crisis at the Millennium (an International Symposium). The
George Washington University Center for History of Recent Science (Sept. 19, 1996), in
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, supra note 6, at 1024, 1024-38; see also, e.g., Kimberly A.
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MIcti. L.
REV. 365, 365 n,2 (2000) (collecting sources on "extensive scholarly debate and increasing
skepticism regarding the role of juries in patent cases").
120 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent"). The mention in § 101 of the word "new" has not been read to provide any sepa-
rate novelty requirement. See Federico, steps note 121, at 178 ("The general part of the
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to describe the case where a patent claim is directed to subject matter
that is not new. 124
 "Statutorily barred" is the phrase in patent law used
to describe the case where a patent claim is directed to subject matter
that, even if new at the time of invention, was exposed to the public
more than a year before the application was filed. 125 The registration
view elucidates why it makes sense for the patent system to have
evolved these doctrines in all their detail. 126
In accordance with the registration view, printed publications de-
scribing a technology count as prior art under the novelty 'provisions
because publicly available documents are good evidence of invest-
ment by their authors and of something on which others could rely. 127
Any printed publication will count, even if in a foreign country, as
long as it is verifiably the type of publication on which a member of
the public could rely. 128
 Indeed, even pending patent applications that
later issue as patents, but that are not yet published, count as prior art
as of their filing date because their inventors have invested in the
verifiable contents of these government-stored documents and those in
Committee Report states that section 102 may be said to describe the statutory novelty
required for patentability, and includes, in effect, an amplification and definition of "new"
in section 101'"); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (1979) ("Notwithstanding the words
new and useful' in § 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for novelty
because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the long-established administrative
practice."), dismissed as moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
124
 The maxim setting forth the so-called "classic infringement test for anticipation,"
which also applies to analysis under the statutory bar, is "What which will infringe if later,
will anticipate, if earlier." See CIIISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 414 (citing Knapp v Morss,
150 U.S. 221 (1893)). For more on how this test is applied in practice, see infra notes 141-
150 and accompanying text.
122 For a discussion of the bar, which also operates as a one-year grace period for filing,
see infra notes 137-140.
126 Compare supra note 48 and accompanying text (rent dissipation theory does not ex-
plain case law), with supra note 108 and accompanying text (reward theories do not ex-
plain case law).
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)—(b) (referring to printed publications).
128 See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (counting a single cataloged
student thesis at Frieburg University in Germany as prior art because it was, inter alia,
physically available to the public); In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (not
counting three student theses at an American university as prior art, even though they
were physically accessible to the public, because there was no evidence they were logically
accessible to the interested public by, for example, being indexed in the library's subject
catalog). Under the registration theory these publications should count as prior art be-
cause they might lead to third-party reliance, not because they might somehow fairly be
said to have been available to the patentee.
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confidential relationships with their inventors could rely on them as
Similarly, uses of a technology only count as prior art if corrobo-
rated by someone other than the one claiming prior invention be-
cause verifiable public use may induce investment in the technology
by observers of this use."° Although § 102 (a) only expressly provides,
in pertinent part, that the invention must not have been "known or
used by others," the word "public" has been read into that statutory
language through case law."' Use that is not public, yet also is not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, may also count as prior art un-
der § 102(f) and § 102(g), but only if corroborated by evidence other
than inventor testimony."2
129 See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1926)
(Holmes, J.) (counting so-called secret prior art as prior art as of the application's filing
date). The present version of this rule is codified in § 102(e) (2). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2).
For the same reasons, an application filed in foreign patent offices will also count as prior
art as of its filing date with one of the international Patent Cooperation Treaty-designated
patent offices, if filed according to the procedural rules of the treaty, and as long as the
application is eventually published in English and designates that it should be sent to the
United States Patent Office. Id. Also for the same reasons, under § 102(e) (1), prior art
effect is extended to pending applications that do not issue as a patent but do get pub-
lished under the rule of publishing eighteen months after filing, which was part of the
1999 American Inventors Protection Act and is codified in § 122(b). Id. §§ 102(e)(1),
122(b). Applications not published pursuant to § 122(b), however, such as those aban-
doned, do not count as prior art. The authors of these documents are able to maintain
their information as a trade secret but the documents themselves will not preclude patent-
ability for others. To be sure, the use by these authors may in certain circumstances pre-
clude patentability under § 102(a) or (g), as discussed infi-a at notes 130-132 and accom-
panying text.
ISO The registration protects against the risk of these investments being later subject to
a patent right to exclude by enforcing the rule that they destroy patentability.
I " Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 476, 494-98 (1850) (not counting use of a technol-
ogy relating to a safe as prior art unless it is accessible to the public). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
132 Section 102(f) is the provision governing cases of derivation, where the party claim-
ing the patent right derived the claimed information from someone else. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(f); see Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576-78 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (holding that § 102(1) prevents patentability if there can be shown to be both
prior, corroborated, conception of the claimed invention, and its communication to the
one claiming to be the first inventor). Where the prior inventor turns out to have sought
its own patent, the Patent Office conducts something called an 'interference proceeding,"
which is the quasi-litigation process initiated when a patent application claims the same
subject matter as another application or an issued patent to determine who is the first
inventor. Section 102(g) is generally understood to govern interference proceedings but
also has been held to be a provision under which information may be treated as prior art
just like under the other subsections of § 102. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). See gen tear CHISUM
ET AL., supra note 6, at 441-51 (describing evolution of case law treating 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
as a provision under which prior use may count as prior art even if not public, as long as it
is not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, as well as the amount of evidence needed to
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Verifiable public use or sale sufficiently in advance of patent ap-
plication filing, even if by the one seeking a patent, can count as prior
art against that application under certain circumstances because it
may induce investment in the technology by observers of this use.'"
For this reason, the statutory bar provisions treat sale or use in public
by either the inventor or a third party as prior art against the inven-
tor's claim to a patent. 13"
The patent system even protects the inventor's own investments to
some extent through allowance of a one-year grace period in which to
file a patent application before the on-sale and public use bars are trig-
gered. This is important because a patent system in which there is no
grace period may provide incentives for decreased rate of disclosure of
new technologies, and a decrease in the overall value of patents. The
decreased rate of disclosure under a system lacking a grace period
would be due to the need to keep potentially patentable information
unpublished before filing the patent application. 135 The decrease in
satisfy that provision). For more on the rules governing priority disputes, see infra Part
III.A.3. Where the prior inventor turns out to have been outside the United States, the
rules become more complicated, as discussed infra Part 111A4. For more on why the use of
priority of invention as a test to determine who wins a patent right as between two or more
claimants makes more sense under the registration and commercialization theories than
the use of filing date, because when invention date is used it is more likely that a valid pat-
ent claim will emerge than when filing date is used, see infra notes 183-186 and accompa-
nying text.
133 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The policy goal of protecting investment has been recog-
nized in the case law associated with this prior art provision. See General Elec. Co. v. United
States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981) ("First, there is a policy against removing inventions
from the public [that] the public has justifiably come to believe are freely available to all as
a consequence of prolonged sales activity.").
Often described as a statutory bar to the patenting of inventions publicized for more
than a year, this provision operates to provide a one-year grace period for publicity that will
not bar patentability. The grace period entered the U.S. patent system in 1839 as a period
of "grace" lasting two years. Act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 353. The period was shortened to
one year in 1939. Act of August 5, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-288, 53 Stat. 1212. It remains so in
the present 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b).
Not all patent systems in the world provide a statutory grace period, although it is not
exactly clear whether most systems end up providing one through case law. See generally
JOSEPH STRAUS, GRACE PERIOD AND THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW
(2001) (study commissioned by the European Patent Organization to examine whether
European patent law should provide a pre-filing grace period) (collecting sources).
134 See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. CORE Labs., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (third-
party use may raise statutory bar).
135 See STRAus, supra note 133, at 80-81, 93 (discussing incentives to suppress publica-
tion under a regime of no grace period).
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overall value of patents would be due to the fear of unknown but un-
avoidable pre-filing disclosures lurking in the history of every patent.'"
But the inventor's own investments have to be balanced against
the reasonable reliance interests of others. For this reason, the grace
period is limited to one year, which allows others to rely on essentially
any public evidence of a technology that is beyond the time of the
grace period.' 37 As soon as an inventor's use of the technology be-
comes available to the public,'" or is on sale at any stage past when it
is "ready for patenting," the clock on the one-year window begins. 139
The subsequent one year provides time for the inventor to decide
whether to prepare and file a patent application, and then to take
these steps if elected.' 4°
Taken together, these rules about what counts as prior art allow
every patent claim to be judged as of its "critical date" against a piece
of prior art's "effective date." 141 The critical date is either the
verifiable date of invention, or one year before the application's filing
date, depending upon whether the invention is being analyzed for
anticipation or bar. 142 The effective date is the date the piece of prior
art is allowed to count as prior art, as discussed above. 143
Under § 102, patentability is precluded if any single item that is
determined to count as prior art under any single subsection of the
136 Id, at 95-96 (discussing decrease hi value of patents under absolute novelty re-
gimes, which do not have a grace period).
427 Under the registration theory, the specific amount of time is arbitrary as long as it
is fixed and knowable ex ante and as long as it is both long enough to allow some grace-
period effect and not long enough to unduly frustrate investment in recently public tech-
nologies. For some history of the various grace periods, see supra note 133.
'" See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 333-38 (1882) (holding use even in a private
undergarment, here corset steels, can count as prior art), compare Metallizing Eng'g Co. v.
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 517-20 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J.) (use will
count if it is commercial), with Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1878) (itie will
not count if merely experimental). To whatever extent potential third-party reliance is a
serious theoretical matter, actual third-party public use as in Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058-59,
counts as prior art because it shows actual reliance.
189 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998) (holding the year begins when the
technology is "subject to a commercial offer for sale" and "ready for patenting").
140 The importance of taking the time to prepare a good application is discussed infra
Part
141 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 326 (providing sample analysis using these terms).
142 Anticipation occurs when the claimed invention is found to have been in the art
that existed prior to the putative invention. See supra notes 118-132 and accompanying
text. A statutory bar occurs when the application is not filed within one year of a bar-trig-
gering event. See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
34 ' This is either the date of use, publication, or filing, depending upon which part of
§ 102 is triggered. See supra notes 118-132 and accompanying text.
86	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 45:55
statute is found to fully disclose the claimed invention. 144
 Importantly,
case law has provided a remarkably easy test for determining whether
an invention is fully disclosed for purposes of this analysis, which can be
seen through the use of the schematic claim chart in Table 1, below. 148
Table 1: Analysis Under § 102 116
PAR,
E 1
E2
E
E
E•
Table 1 compares the elements of a stylized claim against the
prior art for a determination of potential unpatentability or invalidity
under § 102. 147
 The substantive requirement for determining no valid
patent claim under § 102 is triggered only if a single prior art reference
discloses, either expressly or under principles of inherency, each and
every element of the claim, plus enablement. 148
 When mapped onto
144 See supra note 124 (discussing basic statement of test for anticipation).
145 See infra notes 146-150 (discussing application of this test).
146
 El through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily assigned numbers 1
through n. E* represents enablement of the entire claim. PAR1 represents any single prior
art reference, such as a journal article, sample product, student thesis, etc.
147
 The term invalidity refers to the failure of a claim in an issued and successfully ex-
amined patent to satisfy one of the substantive patent-obtaining rules. The term unpaten t-
ability refers to the failure of a claim in a patent application to satisfy one of the substan-
tive patent-obtaining rules. These terms are interchangeable if operating under a soft-look
system like the registration model that does not involve any examination.
The representation of a claim as a listing of its several elements in claim charts like
Table 1 has become so common in patent cases that the local rules of some courts that
hear many patent cases, like the Northern District of California, have for some time re-
quired their use. Citisum ET AL., supra note 6, at 848-49 (discussing local rules for claim
charts). The identification of these elements turns largely on the interpretation, or con-
struction, of a patent claim, which is treated as a matter of law for decision by the court,
and which is the first step in any analysis of either validity or infringement because the
claim must be construed the same for both purposes. See generally id. at 829-73 (discussing
the substantive and procedural law of claim interpretation after the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), The great degree of
debate over the law of claim construction itself injects a degree of uncertainty into this
otherwise relatively crisp analysis. Recent empirical work by Wagner suggests that this un-
certainty may lessen over time as the Federal Circuit develops predictable trends in its case
law. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003), available at
http://www.claimconstruction.com
 (discussing empirical work relating to trends in the
Federal Circuit's law of claim construction) (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
148 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Johnson & Johnson, 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rich, J.) (invalidity under § 102 is "a question of fact, and one who seeks such a
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this table, this means that a proper holding of invalidity will only lie if a
check mark can be found as a matter of fact for every row. 149 And to
achieve a check mark there must be admissible evidence that as a mat-
ter of fact the pertinent content is present in the piece of prior art)"
Although this determination of novelty is relatively easy, the regis-
tration theory recognizes that it may not go far enough in that parties
may invest in a technology before it fully exists. 151 As a result, the pat-
ent system may have to go beyond merely requiring inventions be
new, or not fully disclosed in a single prior art reference; it may also
have to prevent valid patents from covering what anyone is investing
towards, if such a determination can be made inexpensively. 152 Under
the registration theory, this is the role played by the nonobviousness
requirement, discussed below. 153
finding must show that each element of the claim in issue is found, either expressly or
under principles of inherency, in a single prior art reference"); In to Paulsen. 30 F.3d 1475,
1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("In addition, the reference must be enabling and describe the ap-
plicant's claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person of ordi-
nary skill in the field of the invention."); see also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence 'must make clear that the miss-
ing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and
that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be
established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Con t'l Can
Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). The inherency and
enablement doctrines make sense under the registration theory because a disclosure may
induce third-party reliance based upon its ability to enable those in the art to practice its
teachings, even if those teachings do not contain all the words that might appear in some
patent claim. What matters for purposes of such reliance is substance, not form.
"9 This represents the presence of each element in the claim, plus enablement, which as
discussed in the case law supra note 148, is required for a finding of invalidity under § 102.
ISO As discussed in the case law, supra note 148, invalidity under § 102 requires the
prior art disclosure to be in a single reference,
191 Indeed, the likelihood of these investments is logically closely tied to the presence
in the art of a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine elements in the
prior art to work towards the claimed invention. The registration view thereby provides a
justification for the case law that requires these elements as part of a nonobviousness
analysis. For more on the law of nonobviousness, see infra Part IILA.2.
"9 The ultimate question of whether it goes far enough will turn on whether these in-
vestments can be efficiently identified and protected. As discussed infra in Part III,A.2,
although it is clear that the nonobviousness test does a better job on this score than the
former "requirement for invention," it is not entirely clear whether the case law relating to
the test of nonobviousness has implemented the test optimally.
ms
	 supra note 86 (the registration theory helps explain the intricacies of the patent-
obtaining rules whereas the other theories do not).
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2. Nonobviousness
The patent system has long demanded something more than
mere novelty when determining patentability over the prior art. This
additional requirement is called "nonobviousness" in the present sys-
tem.'" It has been given labels in previous systems that are as tauto-
logical as "the requirement for invention;" and its various forms have
generated great difficulty for the courts for over a century. 155 It also
raises significant problems for the patent theories in the literature. 156
Ili For history of the nonobviousness requirement in patent law, see generally
NONOBVIOCSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 38; Sirilla,
supra note 108.
155
 During the first half of the 1900s when called the requirement for invention, before
the 1952 Patent Act, it had become known as "the plaything of the judiciary." Giles S. Rich,
Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in NoNoaviousNtss —THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY, supra note 38, at 1:208. Even after Congress wrote the § 103 nonobvious-
ness into the statute in the 1952 Patent Act, over ten years passed before the Supreme
Court applied the new standard of nonobviousness in Graham and its companion cases.
383 U.S. at 12-37 (consolidated with Calmar and Colgate-Palmolive); Adams, 383 U.S. at 48-
52. For an inside look at the Graham decision, see Tom Arnold, Side Bar: The Way the Law of
Section 103 Was Made, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, supra note 6, at 549, 549-54. Soon
afterwards, the Court re-injected confusion by writing about synergism and combinations,
See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) (holding patent invalid because it was
a mere combination of old elements and had no synergistic effect); Anderson's-Black
Rock, Inc., v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (holding patent invalid be-
cause "No such synergistic result is argued here"). These terms were not weeded back out
of the 11,v until the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982. See Sirilla, supra note 108, at
543. As the Federal Circuit has reminded:
A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic effect" is nowhere found
in the statute, 35 U.S.C. When present, for example in a chemical case, syner-
gism may point toward nonobviousness, but its absence has no place in evalu-
ating the evidence on obviousness....
The reference to a "combination patent" is equally without support in the
statute. There is no warrant for judicial classification of patents, whether into
"combination" patents and some other unnamed and undefined class or oth-
erwise. Nor is there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of pat-
ents based on a judicially devised label. Reference to "combination" patents
is, moreover, meaningless. Virtually all patents are "combination patents," if
by that label one intends to describe patents having claims to inventions
formed of a combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in the
mechanical-structural arts, a "non-combination" invention, i.e., an invention
consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they exist, are rare indeed.
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed, Cir. 1983).
15° See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text (other theories merely point out rent-
seeking concerns that are implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex ante determi-
nations be made about which patents turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-seeking
type of social cost).
2003]	 The Case for Registering Patents 	 89
The version of this requirement called nonobviousness was writ-
ten into the patent system through the 1952 Patent Act to statutorily
jettison the prior case law associated with the former, vague and anti-
patent, requirement called the requirement for invention." 157 Even
the drafters of this new standard recognized that it did not, on its
face, appear to be any more precise in application than the former
requirement. 158 Nevertheless, as the registration theory would predict,
the case law interpreting this new standard correctly has provided an
objective and practicable framework tied to third-party investments. 159
The analysis for a nonobviousness determination under § 103
begins with the entire body of prior art determined to be available
under § 102. 160 But important areas of the prior art are then carved
out so they can be excluded from the nonobviousness analysis.m First,
only art considered to be analogous may be considered under the
nonobviousness analysis. 162 Under the registration theory, which looks
157 See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 AM. PAT. L.
.ASS'N Qj. 26 (1972), reprinted in NONOIWIODSNF_S5 —THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PAIL
ENTABILITS' supra note 38, at 1:501 [hereinafter Rich, Laying the Ghost] (discussing the
great lag between the arrival of the new standard in the statute and its adoption by the
courts); Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1932
Patent Act, 461 PAT. OFF, Soc'v 855 (1964), reprinted in NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE
CONDITION Or PATENTABILITY, supra note 38, at 1:401 (Judge Rich's speech upon receipt
of the Kettering Award in which he discusses the role of nonobviousness in 5 103 as the
replacement for the so-called requirement for invention).
158 Compare Federico, supra note 121, at 183 (the requirement for invention "is an un-
measurable quantity having different meanings for different persons"), with id. at 184 ("The
problem of what is obvious and hence unpatentable is still of necessity one of judgment.").
158 See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text (discussing role of nonobviousness
analysis according to registration theory).
160 Sec Federico, supra note 121, at 180:
In form this section is a limitation on section 102 and it should more logically
have been made part of section 102, but it was made a separate section to
prevent 102 from becoming too long and involved and because of its impor-
tance. The antecedent of the words "the prior art," which here appear in a
statute for the first time, lies in the phrase "disclosed or described as set forth
in section 102" and hence these words refer to the material specified in sec-
tion 102 as the basis for comparison,
Id.
161 Although all of the § 102 art is initially available for analysis under § 103, certain
types of prior art are excluded. According to the registration theory, these Carve outs exist
to remove from consideration the prior art for which the inference of possible innocent
third-party reliance is not reasonable. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing carve outs),
162 The statute provides that the analysis should look to a hypothetical "person having
ordinary skill in the art to which [the claimed] subject matter pertains" and ask whether to
that person "the [invention) as a whole would have been obvious" given the "differences
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to protect the reasonable investment-backed expectations of third par-
ties, non-analogous art is properly discarded because it is not likely to
be the basis for any such reliance. 163
 Importantly, as would be predicted
by the registration theory, the distinction between analogous and non-
analogous art is viewed as important, not as evidence of what the inven-
tor himself or herself could have known about the art, but rather what
was knowable to a hypothetical third party having ordinary skill in the
art ("PHOSITA" ). 164
 Second, secret prior art that would count only un-
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art." 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2000). This in turn requires that several factual inquiries be made: "the scope and con-
tent of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved?
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. A person having ordinary skill in the art according to this frame-
work is sometimes called a PHOSITA, thanks to the coining of that term by Soans. Cyril A.
Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 438-39 (1966). The "perti-
nent art" is selected from among the entire set of prior art identified by § 102 depending
upon whether it is analogous or non-analogous. According to the Federal Circuit:
Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1)
whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.
In re Clay, 956 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Paulsen, 30 F.3d
at 1475 (affirming Patent Office rejection under § 103 because references from the fields
of cabinetry and desktop accessories are properly considered to be analogous art to a pat-
ent claim directed to a clamshell case for a laptop computer under the second of these two
alternative criteria).
163 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of the prior art
rules under the registration theory).
' 64 Sec Soans, supra note 162, at 438-39 (coining the term PHOSITA). Indeed, Judge
Rich, who co-authored § 103, has portrayed this PHOSITA "as working in his shop with the
prior art references—which he is presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him?
In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.) (this metaphor is referred to
as the "Winslow Tableau"); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807
F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who
is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art."); Int'l Cellucotton Prods. Co. v.
Sterilek Co., 94 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.) ("(W)e must suppose the inventor to
be endowed, as in fact no inventor ever is endowed; we are to impute to him knowledge of
all that is not only in his immediate field, but in all fields nearly akin to that field."). Judge
Rich improved upon the Wins/ow Tableau in In re Antic.
In Winslow we said that the principal secondary reference was "in the very
same art" as appellant's invention and characterized all the references as "very
pertinent art.' The language relied on by the solicitor, quoted above, therefore,
does not apply in cases where the very point in issue is whether one of ordinary
skill in the art would have selected, without the advantage of hindsight and
knowledge of the applicant's disclosure, the particular references which the ex-
aminer applied. As we also said in Winslow, "Section 103 requires us to presume
full knowledge by the inventor of the prior art in the field of his endeavor" (empha-
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der § 102(e), (f), and (g) has been statutorily excluded from the
nonobviousness analysis if it is owned by the same entity whose patent
claim is at issue.I 65 The exclusion of this art also makes sense under the
registration theory because no third-party investments will have been
made in art that is commonly owned and kept secret.I 66
The content of the remaining prior art as a whole must then be
surveyed to determine whether it may have reasonably triggered in-
vestment-backed expectations in achieving the subject matter of the
patent claim in issue. 167 Such investments are most likely to have existed
only when there can be found among these many remaining pieces of
art each and every element of the claimed subject matter along with
sufficient teaching, motivation, or suggestion for the pieces that con-
tain those elements to be combined such that there would be a reason-
able expectation of success in establishing the claimed subject matter
when they are combined.I 68 The practical operation of this analysis can
be seen through the use of the schematic claim chart in Table 2, below.
sis, except of "prim;" added), but it does not require us to presume full knowl-
edge by the inventor of prior art outside the field of his endeavor, i.e., of "non-
analogous" art. In that respect, it only requires us to presume that the inventor
would have that ability to select and utilize knowledge from other arts reasona-
bly pertinent to his particular problem which would be expected of a man of
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.
444 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
165 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (providing carve outs). The carve outs for § 102(f) and (g)
were added in 1984 to reverse the holding in In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1288-91 (Fed. Cir.
1973). See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 103, 98 Stat. 3383,
3384 (1984), The carve out for § 102(e) was added in 1999 through § 4807 of the Ameri-
can Inventors Protection Act of 1999. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 4807, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-591 (1999). For a discussion of the history
of these carve outs, see CIIISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 575-78,
166 No carve out is needed for the novelty analysis because the co-owner can keep the
information sufficiently secret before the later claim that the reference will not trigger any
of the subsections of § 102, except perhaps § 102(f). See 35 U.S.0 § 102. For this subsec-
tion, derivation, the co-owner can seek a claim by naming the first inventor, whose activity
is co-owned. If the earlier reference does not disclose enough to invalidate under a novelty
analysis then it would not have been possible for the subject matter to have been claimed
at the time of the earlier reference, and the only opportunity to claim the subject matter is
at the later time. The exclusion of the prior art from a nonobviousness analysis at that later
time helps ensure the possibility of it being covered by a claim. Because the subject matter
is co-owned with the prior art and is not otherwise available under any of the other subsec-
tions of § 102, it also is not the target of third-party investment.
167 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of the nonobvious-
ness requirement according to the registration theory).
168 According to the Federal Circuit:
The consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is whether the
prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this proc-
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Table 2: Analysis Under § 103 169
PAR'	 PARS
E,	 3
E 2	 3
E.
	 3
E
TMS
	 3
RES	 3
Like Table 1, Table 2 compares the elements of a stylized claim
against the prior art, but this time for a determination of nonobvious-
ness under § 103. 170
 Invalidity under this rule of nonobviousness also
requires the presence in the prior art reference, either expressly or un-
ess should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success,
viewed in the light of the prior art. Both the suggestion and the expectation of
success must be founded in the prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure.
In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 584-97 (discussing contours of this analysis in practice and
collecting sources).
169
 As in Table 1, El through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily as-
signed numbers 1 through n; and E* represents enablement of the entire claim. See supra
note 146 and accompanying text. In this table, PART and PAR2 each represent any single
prior art reference, such as a journal article, sample product, student thesis, etc. The key
to the analysis under § 103 is that it permits the looking to more than one reference in the
prior art to find all the elements of the claim plus enableinent but only if in those refer-
ences there can also be found (1) a teaching, motivation, or suggestion (TMS in the table)
for those references to be combined to form the claimed subject matter as well as (2) a
reasonable expectation of success (RES in the table) that the claimed subject matter will
result when the references are so combined.
The apparent crispness of this framework may be somewhat illusory for several rea-
sons. First, as with Table 1, there is some uncertainty regarding claim construction. See
supra note 147 (discussing uncertainty about the law of claim construction and its applica-
tion in any given case). Second, as discussed, supra note 162, the determination of obvi-
ousness is to be done from the perspective of a PHOSITA, and the case law leaves some
substantial uncertainty as to how this hypothetical person is to be conceptualized. The
Federal Circuit has provided a number of factors to consider when determining the char-
acteristics of the PHOSITA:
Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in
the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems
encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity
with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and
(6) educational level of the workers in the field.
Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also CHISUM ET
AL., supra note 6, at 597-600 (discussing the case law relating to the determination of the
PHOSITA).
170 See supra note 147 (discussing the validity and patentability analyses).
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der principles of inherency, of each and every element of the claim,
plus enablement. But, unlike the analysis under § 102, the analysis tin-
der § 103 allows the elements to be spread among two or more individ-
ual pieces of prior art, as long as some additional facts are present:
teaching, motivation, or suggestion to combine those references to ob-
tain the subject matter of the claim as a whole ("TMS"), plus a reason-
able expectation of success in achieving the claimed subject matter
upon the combination ("RES"). 171 When mapped onto this table, this
means that a proper holding of invalidity or unpatentability under
§ 103 will only lie if a check mark can be found as a matter of fact for
every row and at least some tie can be made across all columns using
the TMS and RES that must be found in at least one of the rows."2
Unfortunately, the appropriateness of the nonobviousness re-
quirement is not entirely clear under the registration 'theory. To the
extent that the analysis operates as crisply as suggested by Table 2, it
makes sense as a reasonably inexpensive way to protect against
verifiable investments that may have been made towards a technol-
ogy."3 The practice may deviate some from this framework, however,
when requiring that in every case some weight be attributed to the so-
called secondary considerations of nonobviousness: chiefly, commer-
cial success and long-felt need and failure of others." 4. Long-felt need
17 ' For a discussion of the case law leading up to this composite test, see Slipro notes
162-168.
172 The nonobviousness analysis is presently pertinent when determining patentability
before the Patent Office and when determining validity in litigation, but under a soft-look
system would only be relevant in litigation. See supra note 147. ,
173 See supra notes 151-153 (discussing role of nonobviousness under registration theory).
174 As the Court in Graham stated when describing these secondary considerations and
their purpose:
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have rele-
vancy....
... These legal inferences or subtests do focus attention on economic and
motivational rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible
of judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in pat-
ent litigation. Such inquires may lend a helping hand to the judiciary which,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, is most ill-fitted to discharge the techno-
logical duties cast upon it by patent legislation. They may also serve to "guard
against slipping into use of hindsight," and to resist the temptation to read
into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.
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and failure by others may not represent a deviation and may instead
fit well within the registration theory's framework as outlined in Table
2 because they may be probative evidence of a lack of TMS and RES,
in which case the art may fairly be said to "teach away" from the failed
approaches.'"
In contrast, commercial success may deviate materially from the
framework of the registration theory, although for reasons different
than identified in the literature.'" Exemplifying the literature critical
of the commercial success factor, Robert Merges urges that the system
will operate better when "focus returns to the invention's technical
merits" because we should question "the spurious inferential connec-
tion between success and significant technical advance."'" In his work
on the prospect theory, Kitch takes a different view of commercial
383 U.S. at 17-18,35-36 (citations omitted). It is important to realize that even this initial
Supreme Court statement of the secondary considerations raises the specter of endeavor-
ing to judge the technological merit of the record rather than its factual content, as the
registration theory would require. That is, under the registration theory, the framework is
a factual one that anyone well skilled in trial and appellate practice can use, whereas the
Court seems to be suggesting a deeper foray into the technological merit by speaking of
"technological duties."
The Federal Circuit has gone further than the Supreme Court in Graham by requiring:
"evidence rising out of the so-called 'secondary considerations' must always when present
be considered en route to a determination of obviousness." Stratoflcx, 713 F.2d at 1538-39;
see also CHISUM ET AL, supra note 6, at 601-12 (discussing the case law and commentary on
the secondary considerations and collecting sources).
175 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing TMS and RES); see also In re
Gurley, 27 F.3d 551,553 (Fed. Cir. 1994):
A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon
reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out
in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that
was taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of course de-
pend on the particular facts; in general, a reference will teach away if it sug-
gests that the line of development flowing from the reference's disclosure is
unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.
Id.
176
 In his work pre-dating the prospect theory, Kitch pointed out that commercial suc-
cess may be a poor indicator of the nonobviousness of an invention because it relies upon
too long of a chain of doubtful inferences between the original state of the art and the
eventual success. Edmund Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 293,331-33. Commercial success, however, may operate as a good proxy for
what was not being done by others to the extent it can be determined that its primary
cause is the invention itself, as opposed to other factors such as marketing or happen-
stance. One problem with making such determinations is that they easily can be
influenced by reward theory and thereby become as indeterminate as the reward theory.
177 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives an In-
novation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803,838-42 (1988) (citing Kitch, supra note 176, at 330-35).
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success arguing that this factor matters under the prospect theory be-
cause it shows that the patent has become "the foundation for a series
of now valuable contract rights." 178 On first blush it may appear that
the commercialization theory would view commercial success the
same way, for similar reasons. That is, commercial success might be
seen as relevant not because it says something about how hard it was
to make the invention, but only because it says something about how
commercially relevant the subject matter has become. 178
Although the commercial success consideration may seem to
map on to the incentive to commercialize discussed earlier, it is not
clear that this factor should be considered if minimizing social cost is
the goal. 18° With the benefit of the registration and commercialization
theories combined, commercial success may turn out to be properly
ignored as a potential factor of nonobviousness because the factor
places too much focus on the merits of the invention, which leads to it
not being workable, and not enough focus on the investment-backed
expectations by third parties, which is what matters under these theo-
ries.t 8t Therefore, in the final analysis, it may not be advisable to
abandon the § 103 requirement of nonobviousness in its entirety be-
cause most of the nonobviousness framework is shown both to work
well according to the registration theory and be well explained by the
registration theory. 182
Kitch, supra note 30, at 282-83.
128 See Kieff, supra note 11, at 707-10 (discussing the commercialization theory's focus
on providing incentives for commercialization).
18° See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing registration theory's goals
of minimizing social cost).
tar Sec supra notes 27,81,106-107 and accompanying text (discussing problems with fo-
cus on the merits of the inventions); see also supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing importance of investment-backed expectations by third parties). In cases where
enough time has gone by for there to be evidence of commercial success, there is usually an
infringer or two and then the court is left trying to determine whether to decide in favor of
the coordination benefits of patents or in favor of protecting the investments of the infring-
ers. In a single-cycle game it may be easy to decide in favor of protecting the infringer's
investment. But in a multi-cycle game such a rule would provide incentives to infringe too
much and in an uncoordinated fashion and so instead the coordination benefits dominate
and evidence of commercial success, or lack thereof, should be ignored, not required.
182 Only to the extent the secondary factors so soften the crispness of the framework
modeled in Table 2 that the net benefits of the entire nonobviousness standard fade
should it then be abandoned in its entirety, See supra note 46 (suggesting that the registra-
tion theory may not require the nonobviousness standard and noting that Kitch, supra
note 30, may not be to the contrary). This conclusion, although admittedly not this rea-
soning, accords with the views of at least one framer of the 1952 Patent Act who described
nonobviousness as the heart of the patent system and the justification of patent grants."
Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 157, at 1:501.
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3. First-to-Invent
The patent system's rules governing priority contests between two
or more claimants to a patent right protect investment by awarding
the patent to the one who was first to invent, not first to file.' As rec-
ognized by the commercialization theory, a shift to a first-to-file system
may lead to an increased likelihood that neither party in a priority
dispute will remain with a valid patent because the increased incentive
to file early that may operate to make one party a winner on priority
might also have caused that party to file an application with inade-
quate disclosure. 184
In contrast, under a first-to-invent system there is less of an incen-
tive to rush to file because priority is not determined by filing and, as
a result, there is a lower likelihood that the winner on priority will be
03
 Whereas priority under a first-to-file system is awarded to the application that is
filed first regardless of priority of invention, tinder a first-to-invent system like the present
patent system, priority is awarded to the first inventor. See Kieff, supra note 11, at 749-50
(discussing differences between these two types of priority regimes and collecting sources).
134
 As explained by the commercialization theory when discussing incentive to file
early and its interaction with the disclosure requirements:
A hastily filed application is more likely to be found invalid for nonenablement
or lack of written description under recent Federal Circuit case law. See Amgen
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (Fed. Cu. 1991) (applying the
statutory requirement that the text of the patent application as filed contain
sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art to make and use whatever is cov-
ered by patent claims as eventually issued and applying separate written descrip-
tion requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Vas.Cath Inc. v. Ma-
hurkur, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-67 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the statute also
requires the text of the patent application as filed to satisfy the separate and dis-
tinct written description requirement so as to reasonably convey to those in the
art exactly what is covered by the patent claims as eventually issued); Amgen v.
Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (applying separate written description re-
quirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,
1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court's position on a separate written
description requirement); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119
F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (further solidifying the court's position on
a separate written description requirement); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the same written description re-
quirement to the field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. V. Berkline
Corp., 134 F.3d 1437, 1479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (indicating that the written de-
scription requirement is not limited to complex technologies but applies
equally to simple technologies, like sofa recliners) ....
Kieff, supra note 11, at 750 n.239; see alto S. Leslie Misrock & Stephen S. Rabinowitz, Side
Ban The Inventor's Gamble: Written Description and Prophetic Claiming of Biotechnology Inventions,
in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw, supra note 6, at 319, 319-22 (discussing the application of
the separate written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology).
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left with a patent that fails to meet the disclosure requirements.' The
first-to-invent system thereby at least protects the investments of one
of the claimants. 186 In addition, first-to-file may lead to a winner-take-
all mindset for those seeking patents. This, in turn, may cause a re-
duction in the beneficial inducing power of the reward because each
potential claimant may find the possibility of winning the race to be
too low. Alternatively, it may cause the harmful, rent-dissipating power
to increase as the increase in uncertainty causes even more individuals
to gamble on winning the race. 187
A first-to-invent regime does increase litigation frequency by
bringing priority disputes to available contests, but this is beneficial
because such disputes can also reach issues of validity. 186 The costs of
determining validity in such a proceeding are likely to be less than in
a hard-look examination because the opponent in such a priority dis-
pute is like the alleged infringer in litigation in its ability to more
cheaply obtain and evaluate the information needed to determine
validity. 189 The registration theory thereby explains the persistence of
the first-to-invent aspect of the present patent system despite bar-
188 The reasoning here is similar to that for the one-year grace period. See supra note
140 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the grace period to allow time
to file a properly drafted application when measured under the disclosure requirements of
§ 112). For more on the disclosure requirements, see infra Part III.B.
188 The investments of the one who wins the priority dispute are protected. This
thereby provides for some commercialization benefit, which is important tinder the com-
mercialization theory, and some protection of investment-backed expectations on the part
of at least one of the parties, which is important under the registration theory. Further-
more, it is generally agreed that under the present system most interference proceedings
are won by the first to file anyway. Sec Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1836,
1840 (Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 2001) (approximate 75% success rate for
the first to file); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AM. INTELI.. PROP. L. Ass's Q.J. 193, 217 (1990)
(same); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 425, 427 (2002) (between 1983 and
2000, the first to file won 1917 of the 2858 interference cases). But see Charles L. Gholz, A
Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 163,
181 (2002) (suggesting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") data reports
that the first to file has recently been winning in only 52.5% of the cases).
187 See Kieff supra note 11, at 711 (discussing Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, and
the problem of rent-seeking and rent-dissipating effects in patent law).
=See Charles L. Gholz, Side Bar: Interferences, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, supra note
6, at 511-13 {describing the interference process and its ability to reach issues of validity).
189 The parties to the priority dispute either have the information relating to the prior art
themselves because their own work is being used as prior art against each other or they at least
have the same if not greater incentives to find that information as does an ordinary defendant
in a litigation who is serving the screening function identified by the commercialization the-
ory, See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the screening function).
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monization efforts to have the United States match the rest of the
world, which uses first-to-file. 19°
4. Prior Foreign Use
Like the rules governing novelty generally, the rules about prior
foreign use make sense under the registration theory as tools for pro-
tecting verifiable inve'stment-backed expectations. 191
 For most of the
past century, prior use that was outside of this country would not
count for purposes of either staking a claim to priority for purposes of
obtaining patent rights in a priority contest or defeating patent rights
in a challenge to validity. 192
 But since 1994, uses that occur in coun-
tries that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") or the World Trade Organization ("WTO”) will be avail-
able when seeking to obtain a patent in a priority dispute against an-
other claimant—as a sword—but not when seeking to defeat a patent
owned by another—as a shield. 193
By making prior foreign use that occurs within a country with
whom we are a trading partner under either of these treaties available
to support a claim to a patent, these revisions protect those invest-
ment-backed expectations made abroad that are sufficiently serious to
have led to the filing of a patent application. 194 By leaving all other
foreign prior use unavailable to defeat a patent, these revisions protect
the investments of the one who filed the patent application and disre-
gard those of others whose use is not corroborated by a printed publi-
cation. 195
 The registration theory's focus on verifiable evidence of po-
tential investment-backed expectations thereby explains what may
otherwise appear to be an intricate effort to favor domestic interests.
199 Sec Kieff supra note 11, at 748-50 (discussing harmonization efforts in relation to
first-to-file and first-to-invent).
191
 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing registration theory on prior art
rules and the goal of protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable
evidence).
192
 This is in contrast with the impact of prior use as discussed supra notes 130-132 and
accompanying text (discussing rules relating to prior use).
193 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (2000) (as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531(a), 108 Stat. 4809,4982-83 (1994); North American Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 331,107 Stat. 2057,2113-14
(1993)). For more on the operation of these new provisions, see CHISUM ET AL, supra note
6, at 489-91 (discussing legislative changes and explaining their practical impact).
194 See supra note 112 (discussing registration theory on prior art rules and the goal of
protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence).
195 See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (printed publications anywhere in
the world may be available as prior art because they are verifiable).
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B. The Disclosure Rules Help Coordinate
Under the registration theory, the § 1 1 2 196 disclosure require-
ments decrease social costs by serving to give clear notice about the
property right, and to decrease the chance of duplicative efforts to-
wards the same invention. 197
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit's strong reading of the written description requirement to
put the public on clear notice of what will infringe and what will not
makes sense because the patentee, as the drafter, is the least-cost avoi-
der of such ambiguities. 198 This legal development was controversial
to be sure; yet it marks an important weapon in the system's arsenal
for fighting social cost. Pro-patent arguments against this develop-
ment because it leads to the invalidation of particular patents should
be ignored because this requirement helps to minimize the social cost
of the system. [" Anti-patent arguments focused on particular pat-
ents—such as those on gene fragments—should also be ignored. Such
patents are much less likely to cause the pernicious clogging of down-
stream innovation than feared. In addition, transaction costs may not
be as big of an obstacle as they may seein, 20 because under this case
126 35 U.S.C. § 112 paras. 1-2 (setting forth the disclosure requirements of patent law:
(1) written description; (2) enablement; (3) best mode; and (4) definiteness, which is also
stated as the requirement that the claims "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] ").
The requirements of enablement, written description, and best mode are each judged by
comparing the claims as issued to the application as filed. See id. para. 1 (requirements of the
specification as filed); id. § 132 (prohibition against adding new matter). For a discussion of
the operation of the disclosure requirements, see Cinsum ET AL., StIP/a note 6, at 161-322.
1 °' This signaling function is recognized by Kitch in his discussion of the prospect the-
ory. Kitch, supra note 30, at 287 ("The purpose of the description in the patent is not to
disclose the commercially relevant technology, but to provide a context in which the legal
limits of the claim acquire meaning.").
1211 See supra note 184 (discussing disclosure rules and their impact on patentees' deci-
sions to file more complete disclosures at time of filing).
199 Because the applicant's patent attorney drafts the disclosure for the patent applica-
tion before filing, she is the least-cost avoider of litigation on compliance with the disclosure
requirements as long as the legal standards for these requirements are clear and attainable.
200 See generally Eisenberg, Expenmental Use supra note 6 (exploring an experimental use
exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating potential negative impact of
patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Eisenberg, Norms of
Science, supra note 6 (exploring potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms
in the field of basic biological research); Eisenberg, Public Research, supnr note 6 (offering
preliminary observations about the empirical record of the use of patents in the field of basic
biological research and recommending a retreat from present government policies of pro-
moting patents in that field); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6 (arguing that patents can
deter innovation in the field of basic biological research); Rai, supra note 6 (suggesting that
patents on multiple gene fragments, such as ESTs, could block the use of a larger DNA se-
quence of which they are a part).
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law many such downstream activities would not infringe most such
valid claims."'
Although not strictly speaking a requirement about the content
of a patent application, the new statutory requirement for publication
of applications eighteen months after filing is properly considered
here.202
 This is because it can operate similarly to the disclosure re-
quirements in improving the important signaling function patents
play in controlling the potential rent-seeking, and therefore rent-
dissipating, behavior of those others who also might be working to-
wards the same invention as claimed in the patent. 203 Indeed, the reg-
istration model explored in this Article would go a great deal further
towards disseminating information about patent applications by post-
ing them on the World Wide Web for free as soon after filing as ad-
ministratively prac ticable."4
Kieff, supra note 6, at 699-700 (showing why a patent claim directed to a gene
fragment like an EST cannot be construed to cover a larger DNA sequence, such as a sub-
stantial portion of an entire gene, and citing Kieff, supra note 11, at 721-22 (noting that if
the patentee attempts to argue that the claim to the smaller fragment covers the fragment
within the environment of the larger DNA, then the claim is likely to be held invalid over
the prior art or for lack of adequate disclosure because to be valid, the claimed subject
matter must be new and nonobvious, and the patent application must disclose the metes
and bounds of the claimed subject matter with physical and chemical detail as well as how
to make and use it, and alternatively pointing out that because ESTs exist in nature in the
company of the other DNA of the genome, a typical EST claim must be limited in order to
overcome this prior art to a version of the EST in some specific environment other than its
natural one, such as isolated from all other DNA or inserted into an artificially engineered
piece of DNA, and the details of the degree of isolation or of the engineered piece of DNA
must also be provided so as to satisfy the disclosure requirements)). Ironically, many of the
arguments that see a large anticommons problem with patents on things like ESTs also
criticize these aspects of the Federal Circuit's approach to the written description re-
quirement; yet the latter ameliorates the former.
202 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat.
1501A-552, 1501A-56I (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000)) (eighteen
month publication of applications).
203 Thus, the eighteen-month publication provision of patent law is one for which the
prospect and rent dissipation theories discussed supra Part I also have good explanatory power.
204 For a discussion of the registration model, see supra Part II. Although the registra-
tion theory suggests adoption of the registration model and immediate publication, the
registration theory may not be quite as supportive of such pre-issuance publication under
an examination system like the present one because it will have to reach compromises that
are undoubtedly fair from a systemic perspective but that will yield a variety of incentives
for strategic behavior, such as the incentive by competitors to, before grant of the patent,
use the publication to teach them how to engage in as much otherwise infringing activity
as possible, and the incentives to achieve a stronger bargaining position against a competi-
tor using the leverage of its investments based on a public use up to just under thirty-six
months before publication of the application (based on the combined one-year grace pe-
riod and eighteen-month publication windows). For a discussion of the legislative com-
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C. Summary: The Name of the Game is the Claim
The registration theory's view that the patent system can and
should operate to minimize social costs is confirmed by recent and
important empirical work by John Allison and Lemley, which shows
that by almost any measure patents are becoming what they call
"more complex". over time. 205 The increase in the number of prior art
references cited and the length of prosecution before the Patent
Office, which Allison and Lemley identify and then use as proxies for
complexity, can be seen as evidence that issued patents are getting
better scrutiny without moving towards a hard-look system.206 Fur-
thermore, the increase in variation among patents identified by the
Allison and Lemley article can be seen as evidence of increased selec-
tivity in deciding which patents get increased scrutiny. 207
The combination of these two effects provides some evidence
that it is patentees themselves who are acting rationally to choose to
increase scrutiny on only those patents they believe to be most impor-
tant. 208 If so,
promises reached under the eighteen-month publication provisions of the current system,
see CItLSUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 116-22.
202 _John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Grouting Complexity of the United States Patent Sys-
tem, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 passim (2002) (providing empirical evidence on complexity of patents).
108 Cf, e.g., JOSH LERNER, WHERE DOES STATE STREET LEAD? A FIRST LOOK AT FINANCE
PATENTS, 1971-2000, at 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7918,
2000), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7918 (suggesting that poor patent quality of some
early business method patents may be due to their relatively anemic citation of prior art,
which is one of the complexity parameters explored by Allison and Lemley, supra note 205).
201 Patent applicants and their patent attorneys draft the patent disclosure and claims.
The Patent Office can reject or allow the claims but otherwise has only limited input to the
content. For an overview of the process of arguing to the Patent Office for the right to a
patent, which is called "patent prosecution," see Cilisum ET AL., supra note 6, at 91-128.
The increase in variation seen by Allison and Lemley is therefore evidence that some pat-
entees are choosing to seek patents that are less likely to withstand challenge in court, and
others are seeking patents that are more likely to withstand such challenge.
208 That is, this may be evidence of a type of self-screening by the patentees themselves
based on what challenges to validity they anticipate their competitors might mount. See supra
notes 59-64 (discussing the screening function). Importantly, to make these determinations
effectively, the patentees themselves often have to seek out the very information relating to
validity that, in the first instance, is in the hands of third parties and would cost an opponent
of the patentee substantial money to seek out and bring to bear later to support arguments
over validity in civil litigation. Patentees are thereby internalizing those social costs when they
get this information and the litigation conduct reforms discussed infra Part IV.E would pro-
vide added incentives for patentees to put this information to proper use. For more on self-
screening by patentees, see generally John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business
Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. Lj. (forthcoming November 2003) (referring to this
issue as the "self-selected value theory"), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ab-
then they are acting in a way that both internalizes and
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mitigates social cost. 209
Patentees are motivated to rationally choose to behave this way
because they face a complex gamble when selecting claim scope. 210
The requirements for patentability discussed above operate in concert
to force a form of self-discipline on patent scope that mitigates the
complex economic concerns explored by Merges and Richard Nel-
son. 211
 As Judge Giles S. Rich often said about patents, "the name of the
game is the claim .. [and] the function of claims is to enable everyone
to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the patent
and what does not."212
 According to Judge Rich, claims present a fun-
damental dilemma for every patentee because the stronger a patent
the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger it is."215
 By this
he meant that a broad patent claim is strong on offense because it
covers more and, therefore, is more likely to be infringed, but it also is
weak on defense because it may cover something in the prior art or
fail to be supported by a sufficiently detailed disclosure in the rest of
the patent, and, therefore, is more likely to be invalid. In contrast, a
stract=421980; John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. U. (forthcoming 2004), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=.426020.
"9
 Those patents that are getting better treatment up front by the applicants are less
likely to cause the pernicious impact associated with the one-click patent discussed supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text, which is caused by any issued patent that is legally pre-
sumed valid because it issued yet nevertheless quite likely to be held invalid in court in
practice. See supra Part H (comparing the advantages of the registration model over the
present examination practice).
210
 Many of the important decisions facing a patentee must be made ex ante before
filing the application for several reasons. First, the disclosure requirements compare the
claims as issued against the application as filed. See supra Part 111.B. Second, the statutory
bar aspects of the prior art requirements measure the claims as issued against the state of
the art at filing. See supra Part IIIA1. Therefore, patentees must always balance the time
needed to write a sufficient disclosure against the chance this time will allow for the crea-
tion of so-called "intervening art," because it came into existence between the date of in-
vention and the date of filing.
211 Merges & Nelson, supra note 91, at 845 (exploring economic implications of vary-
ing patent scope).
212 See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499, 501 (1990), quoted in
Hilton Davis Chem, Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (1995) (Plager, J.,
dissenting, joined by Archer, CJ., and Rich & Louriejj.), rev 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Al-
though Judge Rich made these remarks in a discussion about the benefits of the present
examination system, they are even more germane to the model registration system.
210 See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 641, 644 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (responding to proposed legislation S. 1042,
90th Cong. (1967) and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967) and PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE
PATENT SYS„ To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING
TECHNOLOGY (1966)).
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narrow claim is weak on offense, because it covers less and, therefore,
is less likely to be infringed, but it also is strong on defense because it is
likely both to avoid the prior art and to be supported by a sufficiently
detailed disclosure, and, therefore, also is less likely to be invalid.2"
To be sure, a patentee's offensive drive is strong, but it is also
strongly undercut by the defensive drive via the linkage through claim
breadth.215 This is because the costs of preparing a patent with claims
of meaningful scope are substantial, whereas an adjudication of inva-
lidity destroys all private value of the patent. 216 The patentee's draft-
ing decisions before filing must take into consideration several fac-
tors. First, compliance with the disclosure requirements, when tested
in litigation, looks to the disclosure made at filing. 217
 Second, if the
patentee amends the application that was originally filed, then the
scope the patentee may later be able to capture in an infringement
suit through recourse to the doctrine of equivalents ("DOE") may be
cabined by the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, which is trig-
gered by such amendments. 218 Third, because the best information
about validity is most likely to be held by parties other than the pat-
214 Id. (explaining patentee's dilemma, or -riddle").
215 See supra notes 212-214 (discussing the linkage).
210 Although the filing fees paid to the Patent Office are relatively modest, the costs of
attorney and client time to draft a disclosure that will comply with the patent-obtaining
requirements can be well over ten times that amount. As of January 1, 2003, the basic filing
fee is $740, or $370 for what the Patent Office views as a "small entity." 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)
(2003). The attorney's fees for preparing and prosecuting the application are described by
Lemley as follows:
Prosecuting patents is expensive. There is some disagreement on precisely
how expensive it is, but the general range of costs for prosecuting a patent from
start to finish (including application and various filing fees paid to the PTO,
and attorney's fees not only to prepare and file the application, but to respond
to office actions and continue prosecution through to issuance or abandon-
ment) appears to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent. I have chosen a conserva-
tive average estimate of $20,000 per initial application taken through prosecu-
tion. Much of this cost is front-loaded: it covers an attorney's time in meeting
with the inventor, writing the application, and writing patent claims, as well as a
substantial filing fee to the PTO. Other costs are incurred on a piecemeal basis
as prosecution progresses, and include both attorney's fees and PTO fees to file
each new piece of paper, up to and including the issuance of the patent itself.
These cost averages include both patents that are ultimately issued and patent
applications that are ultimately rejected by the PTO without being revived.
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1498-99 (footnotes omitted) (collecting sources).
217 See supra note 196 (discussing the disclosure rules).
218 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co„ 520 U.S. 17, 25-34 (1997)
,} (reaffirming the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a legal limit on DOE).
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entee,219
 the patentee experiences substantial incentive either to err
on the side of narrowness or to obtain that information so the patent
can be drafted around it. 220
 It is this incentive for the patentee to
make its own correct determination of validity and scope before filing
that helps explain the evidence discussed above from Allison and
Lemley that patentees themselves are making decisions that tend to
keep their own patent scope "just right" from a social perspective. 22t
This view of what makes scope just right under the registration
theory is quite different from those under the reward, prospect, or
rent dissipation theories. Importantly, scope that is just right under
the registration theory is scope that is determined using lowest ad-
ministrative costs possible to do two things: (1) protect verifiable in-
vestment-backed expectations by avoiding patenting of the prior art;
and (2) facilitate bargaining over, and avoidance of, the patent by en-
suring the application's disclosure and claims combine to leave the
patent scope as clear as possible. Patent scope achieved this way does
not simply depend upon trivial decisions on the margin to file addi-
tional claims of different scope. Rather, each claim can be thought to
represent a class of potentially infringing memberS. Under the patent-
obtaining rules, that class must be adequately disclosed and none of
its members must have been within the prior art. Under hard-look
systems, such claims may have pernicious impact because they may be
presumed valid although actually likely to be proven invalid if chal-
lenged. Under soft-look systems, especially the registration model, the
private benefit an applicant would get from strategic games involving
the filing of excessive variation in claims decreases. At the same time,
for those claims that happen to have appropriate scope, the public
cost decreases and the public benefit increases. Indeed, the patentee's
private efforts, at the time of drafting, to achieve the maximum scope
allowable under the patent-obtaining rules facilitates later evaluation
of the patent's potential validity and infringement by potential trans-
action partners, competitors, and courts. 222
 Therefore, as suggested by
219 See supra Part 111.A.1 (discussing the many types of prior art that are in the hands of
those other than the patentee).
220 patent claim that ends up covering any part of the prior art is invalid. Sec supra
notes 123-124. Under the registration theory, post-issuance procedures available to amend
the claims tinder the present examination system should be avoided to ensure that the
patent applicant has the strongest incentive possible to get right the document that is reg-
istered and published and on which everyone will rely.
221
 See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence).
222
 The reforms discussed infra in Part IV.E help each of these parties use this informa-
tion, and the information relating to the prior art and infringement.
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the registration theory, there are a number of essential registration
aspects inherent in the present examination system and they help
minimize social costs.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE MODEL FOR THE PRESENT PATENT SYSTEM
The registration model and its accompanying registration theory
show that the present patent system, which is based on examination,
in fact operates with many registration aspects. 225 Nevertheless, the
registration theory shows how the system could be improved by a
number of reforms of varying severity. More specifically, the registra-
tion theory elucidates the benefits of a number of reforms relating to
statutory subject matter and utility, DOE, deference to the Patent
Office, and post-issuance procedures, which could all be adopted
without switching to a fully soft-look system like the registration
mode1.224 The registration theory also elucidates the benefits of re-
forms relating to litigation of patents and the presumption of validity
that essentially would have the effect of switching to a soft-look system
like the registration model. 225
A. Reforms for Subject Matter and Utility
The § 101 226 requirements of utility and statutory subject matter
should be amended to avoid the public choice and administrative
costs they have inflicted over the years. 227 Both of these requirements
423 See supra Part M.
224 See infra Parts IV.A—D (discussing reforms relating to statutory subject matter and
utility, DOE, deference to the Patent Office, and post-issuance procedures).
226 See infra Part IV.E (discussing reforms relating to litigation of patents and the pre-
sumption of validity).
226 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (statutory subject matter and utility).
227 A variety of per se exclusions in patent law have been perceived. See, e.g., Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) ("A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-18 (1980)
(holding living organisms not per se unpatentable); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (hub-and•spoke mutual fund
accounting system is patentable subject matter); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541-45 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (en bane) (computer system for producing a smooth waveform on a raster dis-
play is patentable subject matter).
The central problem with these perceived exclusions is that they did not provide
workable distinctions ex ante between what would prospectively be considered the line
between the patentable and the unpatentable, leaving decisionmakers to entertain argu-
ments about a special exception in any case from anyone able to fund the attack. See supra
note 80 (discussing some public choice problems associated with this type of decision mak-
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have been used to invalidate patents or deny patents based on argu-
ments that make no sense when mapped onto the patent system. 228
They are vestiges of reward theories and are unworkable.
Although § 101 of the statute is generally viewed as setting forth
two requirements for patentability—utility and subject matter—the
case law229
 provides some authority for the proposition that this sec-
tion is either merely prefatory, or designed to rule in what years of
case law had tried to rule out. Section 101 provides in its entirety:
§ 101. Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this ti-
tl e. 230
During a surprisingly active exchange of cases between the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A.") (the predecessor court to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit) involving the famous cases of In re Bergy and Dia-
ing). These ever-shifting sands prevented some industries, like the computer software
business, from gaining sufficient traction to organize themselves into anything but indus-
tries characterized by a single large player—for example, Microsoft. See Kieff, supra note
11, at 744 (the inability to obtain meaningful "patent protection for software for such a
large and important portion of the industry's life may have contributed to the continued
unchallenged dominance of a huge entity like Microsoft"). The result was bleak and re-
markably reminiscent of the one described by Dickens:
At the Patent Office in Lincoln's Inn, they made 'a draft of the Queens bill',
of my invention, and a 'docket of the bill'. I paid five pound, ten, and six, for
this. They 'engrossed two copies of the bill: one for the Signet Office, and
one for the Privy-Seal Office'. I paid one pound, seven, and six, for this.
Stamp duty over and above, three pound. The Engrossing Clerk of the same
office engrossed the Queen's bill for signature. I paid him one pound, one.
Stamp-duty again, one pound, ten. I was next to take the Queen's bill to the
Attorney-General again, and get it signed again. I took it, and paid five pound
more. I fetched it away, and took it to the Home Secretary again. He sent it to
the Queen again. She signed it again. I paid seven pound thirteen, and six,
more, for this. I had been over a month at Thomas Joy's. I was quite wore out,
patience and pocket.
Charles Dickens, A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent, in CHARLES DICKENS AND THE `POOR MAN'S
TALE OF A PATENT' 15, 18-19, 29 ( Jeremy Phillips ed., 1984) (including appendices about
the "circumlocution office" described to be "(as everybody knows without being told) the
most important Department under Government").
225 See, e.g., infra notes 236, 240 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
23°
 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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mond v. Chakrabarty, the anatomy of this statute was carefully dis-
sected.231 In 1979, the C.C.P.A. in Bergy decided that "in 1952 Con-
gress voiced its intent to consider the novelty of an invention under
§ 102 where it is first made clear what the statute means by 'new',
notwithstanding that this requirement is first named in § 101."252 The
same reasoning would support the view that the word "utility" should
be considered under the disclosure requirements of § 112, such as
"enablernent," despite that it is first named in § 101 as well.
If a statutory construction approach is unconvincing, a review of
theory may be. The utility requirement should be low because the re-
quirement itself serves no economic purpose. A useless patent will not
be infringed. 2" Moreover, for a patent that lacks utility because of a
lack of practical application, at least the information published in the
patent teaches something good (and again no one will infringe). if
there is lack of utility due to the inventor getting the science or engi-
neering underlying the alleged invention wrong, then the informa-
tion published is valuable in teaching others what not to do. Finally, a
patent of uncertain commercial utility provides incentives for the pat-
entee to license broadly.254
The case law controlled by the 1995 decision of the Federal Circuit
in In re Brana has largely adopted this view and today, as a matter of
positive law, courts give a great deal of deference to a patent applicant's
assertion of utility. 2" To some extent this case law may be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Brenner u Manson.2" Never-
231 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307-18; Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-64 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich,
J.), dismissed as moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (companion case to Chakmbarty).
2" 596 F.2d at 961.
233 Kieff, supra note 11, at 721-22 (showing why the utility requirement is itself useless
and why lack-of-utility arguments are most generously viewed as non-infringement of a
properly construed claim so as to avoid the apparently inconsistent position of a defendant
showing the activity to be of sufficient use to have prompted the infringement lawsuit
while arguing that they are of no use).
234 Id. at 726 (discussing the powerful incentive to license broadly that is caused by risks
of commercialization, such as those that would obtain where commercial utility is uncertain).
235 According to the Federal Circuit, a two-step analysis is required:
[First, the Patent Office or alleged infringer] has the initial burden of chal-
lenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure. [Sec-
ond,] [o]nly after the [challenger] provides evidence showing that one of or-
dinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the
burden shift to the applicant to [prove utility].
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
236 See 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966) (holding patent invalid for lack of utility, perhaps
because there was no specific commercial use of the products produced by the claimed
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theless, because a utility requirement would not protect any investment-
backed expectations and proponents of a strong requirement fail to
give any test for utility that is administrable, the registration theory sug-
gests the requirement should simply be abandoned. 237
The statutory subject matter requirement should also be low—
fixed at "anything under the sun made by man"238—to avoid both the
problems of setting categories of subject matter and the inevitable
wasteful costs that would be spent by parties near the margins be-
tween categories. 239
 The charge that the law must change to accom-
modate new subject matters for which patents are being sought makes
little sense. Among the many legal regimes that might possibly face a
charge of not being designed to deal with new technologies, the pat-
ent system must have the best defense precisely because it is the one
system expressly designed with such unforeseen technologies in
mind.240
 Indeed, technologies that are so foreseeable as to be obvious
are not patentable in view of the system's most basic patentability re-
quirement: that the claimed invention not be in the prior art. As a
result, we should, at a minimum, avoid adopting the suggestion by
some critics that we develop special rules to accommodate particular
areas of patentable subject matter where protection is only recently
being sought, such as biotechnology, computer software, and finance.
We perhaps' also should be clearer in holding that the law is firmly
settled on this issue by expressly stating that statutory subject matter
raises no distinct hurdle to patentability. 241
process, stating "a patent is not a hunting license"); see also CH ISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at
707-27 (recognizing the inconsistency and discussing modern treatment).
257
 The prospect, rent dissipation, commercialization, and registration theories would
each see the granting of a hunting license to be entirely appropriate either as an effort to
coordinate the hunt to avoid the risk of accidental shootings, to avoid racing, or because
there are no investment-backed expectations to protect.
23a Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
2" For example, consider that during the prior case law when software was perceived
to be unpatentable, applicants would simply claim it "in a box" or "on a disk" by drafting
claims to a general purpose computer (a thing) programmed a certain way or a magneti-
cally recordable medium (again a thing) on which a certain message had been recorded.
For a detailed discussion of the evolution in this area, see CHISUM ET AL., sopro note 6, at
728-828. For more on the problems of per se categories of unpatentable subject matter,
see Allison & Tiller, supra note 208.
240
 The majority opinion of the sharply divided Supreme Court embraced this view in
Chakrabarty: "This is especially true in the field of patent law. A rule that unanticipated
inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law
that anticipation undermines patentability." 447 U.S. at 316.
24I As the Federal Circuit recognized in 1998 in State Street Bank:
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B. Reforms for the Doctrine of Equivalents
An understanding of incentive for individual patentees to get
patent scope "just right"212 provides some guidance on the ongoing
battle over the DOE, which allows a patentee to win an infringement
suit against something that is not literally covered by the claims. 245 Al-
lowing the patentee recourse to this doctrine is bad in that it weakens
the important self-disciplining effect described above; eliminating the
doctrine would be good in that it would accentuate this incentive. 244
Importantly, this criticism of the DOE is not merely driven by
concerns about absolute crispness, or advantages of rules over stan-
dards.245 Rather, the core argument is a matter of comparative institu-
tional economics.
To understand the intuition of the argument it may help to first
consider that the DOE is structurally at odds with the basic approach
to claims under the present positive law rules of the. patent system,
which together yield an approach known as "peripheral claiming"—as
distinct from "central claiming"—in which the function of the patent
claim is not to set forth the heart of the protected subject matter but
rather to set forth its outer bounds. 246 A determination of infringe-
ment under a central claiming approach requires the court to deter-
mine the heart of the invention and whether the putative infringe-
ment is close enough to that heart to justify a judgment of
infringement. A determination under peripheral claiming requires
the court to determine only the outer bounds of the claim. Anything
within those bounds infringes and anything outside does not. The
The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is
directed to—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—but
rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its
practical utility. Section 101 specifies that statutory subject matter must also
satisfy the other "conditions and requirements" of Title 35, including novelty,
nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice.
149 F.3d at 1375 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 210-221 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-41 (discussing the doctrine of equivalents
and its limits).
244 Recent work by Wagner makes a similar argument to justify cabining the reach of
DOE. See Wagner, supra note 50, at 244. • 	 •
245 For more on the general debate about rules over standards, see supra note 17.
246 For more on peripheral claiming, see F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA,
in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES, supra note 56 at 125, 135. See also supra Part I1I.C. (dis-
cussing claims under the present system).
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DOE in the present patent system, even though not provided for in
the statute, is an odd exception to the peripheral nature of our pres-
ent peripheral claiming system precisely because it allows the pat-
entee to capture something outside of the claim. 247
Although the DOE has some general intuitive attraction because
it gives some flexibility, the registration theory shows how the pat-
entee can achieve even greater flexibility in a manner that is not only
less costly to the patentee but also to all third parties by simply draft-
ing a better patent disclosure at the outset. Under the disclosure rules
of patent law, the patentee at the time of filing can draft a disclosure
that will support claims of varying scope. 248
It may be possible that the information-forcing benefits of a sys-
tem with no DOE would be outweighed by the added costs it may en-
courage some patent applicants to incur as a precaution. But, on a
per-patent basis, the direct costs to patentees of this drafting effort
(largely legal fees) are substantially less than those associated with liti-
gating DOE issues later in court. In addition, the indirect costs of hav-
ing to decide whether this extra flexibility on scope is worth such di-
rect costs will be cabined to some extent by the small size of the
potential gain from avoiding the direct costs themselves. Even if it
turned out that putative patentees, on average, do not make at least
roughly appropriate decisions about which of their own patents de-
serve more or less attention at the drafting stage, a significant moral
hazard problem certainly would arise if decisions on application of
the DOE were understood to turn on this type of error by individual
patentees. Moreover, the DOE imposes substantial litigation costs on
competitors of the patentee. The general uncertainty arising out of
the DOE can also chill business transactions of all sorts, including
commercialization efforts by competitors and downstream developers
as well as by business partners of even the patentee.
It also may be possible that the information-forcing benefits of a
system with no DOE would be outweighed by other costs to the sys-
tem. One major component of these countervailing costs will be the
decreased commercialization benefits to society that would be associ-
ated with those inventions protected by patents whose patentees, at
247
 This may be one reason why the principal drafter of the present system, Judge Rich,
joined two of the dissenting opinions in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner:fenkinson Co.
that objected to the DOE. 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (1995) (Plager, J., dissenting, joined by
Archer, CJ., and Rich & Louriejj.), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dis-
senting, joined by Rich & Plager, 11.).
248 See infra notes 251-258 and accompanying text.
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the time of filing, elected to spend too little on patent drafting. But
once again, a significant moral hazard problem certainly would arise
if decisions on application of the DOE were understood to turn on
this type of error by individual patentees as well.
Alternatively, as Douglas Lichtrnan suggests, information forcing
may be of no benefit if, at the time of filing, the patentee may not be
able to draft an application that could convey appropriate patent
scope giyen the inevitably changing state of technological vocabular-
ies. 249 But to the extent it suggests that a patentee somehow deserves
the broader scope captured by the DOE, this view of what is an appro-
priate patent scope would seem to be based on a version of a reward
theory and would fail to account for the focus on minimizing social
cost that is central to positive law rules for patentability—especially the
disclosure rules—as elucidated by the registration theory. 25°
In addition, it is not clear whether such concerns about changes
in technology actually obtain, as a practical matter, under a peripheral
claming system. Under a peripheral claiming approach, each claim
can be viewed as a simple logical list in which each word, or element,
in the claim is considered a required item in the list. This list of ele-
ments can be compared against the allegedly infringing product or
process in much the same way it was compared against the prior art in
Tables 1 and 2. 251 Patent infringement occurs when each and every
element of the claim can be found in the allegedly infringing product
or process. 252 According to such a comparison, the more elements
there are, the harder it is to infringe. Instead of trying to determine
and then recite in the claim every particular use by potential future
infringers, a prudent patentee under such a system tries to determine
the general nature of these potential uses and then recites them as a
class in the claim. For example, rather than drafting a claim that re-
cites, among other elements, a list of specific expected fastener tech-
nologies such as nails, screws, and Velcro ®, a prudent patentee might
recite "a fastener" as a claim element and then elsewhere in the pat-
249 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LICHTTIAN, RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL 27-28
(Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 200, 2003), available at
h ttp:/ /ssrn.com/abstract= 455380.
260 See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing what makes scope just right
under the registration theory). See generally supra Part III.
255 See supra notes 146 (describing Table 1) and 169 (describing Table 2) and accom-
panying text,
262 For a detailed discussion of the law of infringement, see generally CHISUM ET At..,
supra note 6, at 829-73. Also recall the maxim linking the tests for infringement and an-
ticipation. See supra note 124.
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ent provide a careful disclosure of what is meant by this term includ-
ing a qualitative description and representative examples. 253
This approach to claiming and drafting deals well with even un-
knowable future technologies. Put simply, this is the job of a good
patent lawyer and one reason why patents are legal documents
drafted by lawyers for interpretation by judges and lawyers, not tech-
nical documents evaluated by peer review. 254
 The standard for satisfac-
tion of the disclosure rules' written description requirement is merely
whether the disclosure as filed conveys to a PHOSTTA255 that the in-
ventor had possession of the claimed invention at that time; ipsis ver-
bis disclosure is not needed. 256
 As a result, a prudent drafter easily can
employ claim elements that are disclosed to be a "genus and its con-
stituent species" (or a class of constituent members) withouthaving to
identify in the disclosure every single species (or member), as long as
the disclosure provides a clear indication of how to determine mem-
bership in the genus (Or class), which can be shown through the
analogy to a path through a forest marked by certain trees:
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making
blaze marks on the trees. It is no help in finding a trail ... to
be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees.
Appellants are pointing to trees. We are looking for blaze
marks which single out particular trees. 257
To be sure, the crafting of a disclosure that complies with these rules
may itself be difficult; and no disclosure will be perfect. Recent opin-
255
 In contrast, under a central claiming system, there can be a premium to reciting in the
claim examples of the particular items that are likely to be infringing because, unless expressly
mentioned, such items are unlikely to be considered sufficiently central to the claim.
254 See Giles S. Rich, Foreword to CH ISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at iii, v-vi (noting that it is
anachronistic to view the claims as being drafted by inventors rather than by patent attor-
neys and agents).
255
 As discussed supra note 164 and accompanying text, a "PHOSITA" is a "person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art."
255
 Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir, 1996) (Clevenger, J.).
257 Id. (quoting In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 994-95 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J.)). The
well-known biotechnology cases of Amgen, Inc. v. Chug-ai Pharmaceutical Co., Fiers u Revel,
and Regents of the University of California u Eli Lilly EP' Co. gave some practical teaching about
how to satisfy this standard: the applicant must give details about the physical or chemical
structure of the claimed invention; merely describing it by function does not suffice. Lilly,
119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cu. 1997); Fiers, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168-71 (Fed Cir. 1993);
Amgen, 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The furniture and computer cases of Gentry
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline corp. and Lockwood u American Airliner, Inc. teach that this standard is
not technology specific. Gentry, 134 F.3d 1473, 1478-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (sofa recliner);
Lockwood, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (computer reservation system).
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ions of the various Federal Circuit judges evidence a particular ten-
sion about whether this disclosure standard is so fixed, and whether it
can be satisfied. 258 Thus, the disclosure rules themselves to some ex-
tent raise many of the same concerns as the DOE. In the final analysis
of the tension between the effort to achieve flexibility through either
the DOE or the disclosure requirements, the registration theory's
contribution is to highlight, as a matter of comparative institutional
255 In September 2002, in PIN/NIP Inc. v. Platte Chemical Co., the Federal Circuit re-
peated that the test for compliance with the written description requirement requires a
comparison of the claims as issued against the disclosure as originally filed, and held invalid
a claim not supported by the disclosure of the unamended application. 304 F.3d 1235,
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2002). And in October 2002, in All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental
Products, Inc., the court reiterated, as in Fujikawa, that the test does not require the disclo-
sure to provide the identical words of the claims, ipsis verbis; the test only requires disclo-
sure to convey the substance of the claim to a PHOSITA. 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
But, in January 2003, the court in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., showed a sub-
stantial split in views on the written description requirement. Compare 314 F.3d 1313, 1330-
34 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2003) (majority opinion), with id. at 1358-61 (Clevenger, J., dissenting
in part), The majority opinion, written by Judge Paul Michel and joined by Judge Alvin
Schall, considered at some length a number of specific written description arguments, but
the common theme it reiterated for each was relatively uncontroversial: that the test for
compliance is measured against the actual subject matter as claimed, not against its
precursors, parts, or gist (as would be the case under a central claiming system). Id. at 1330-
34. To the extent the dissent was merely disagreeing on the facts and suggesting that some
additional necessary disclosure could have been delivered but was not, the opinion is not
doctrinally remarkable. But the language ofJudge Raymond Clevenger's dissenting opinion
seems to express concern that the majority's approach elevates form over substance and
would allow the crafty patentee to avoid the need to disclose as much detail by drafting a
broader claim. Id. at 1358-61 (Clevenger, J., dissenting in part). But under the
genus/species approach discussed earlier, it flows as a matter of logic that less detail is
needed to describe a broader genus. Describing the genus "houses" requires less detail than
describing the genus 'Victorian houses." That is what the term "broader" means, If the
written description were as hard to satisfy as this opinion seems to suggest, then it would
raise all of the same objections raised earlier against the information-forcing benefits of a
no-DOE system. Finally, other important divisions over the written description requirement
are also evident in the court's recent opinions on this topic. See, e.g., MOBA, B.V. v.
Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (including a per curiam opinion
from a panel comprising Judges Randall Rader, Schall, and William Bryson, as well as
separate concurring opinions by Judges Rader and Bryson), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 646
(2003) (mem.); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
replaced on reh'g, 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (including a majority opinion authored by
Judge Alan Lourie, an opinion concurring in denial of petition for rehearing en banc by
Judge Lourie, in which Judge Pauline Newman joined, an opinion concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc by Judge Newman, an opinion concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc by Judge Timothy Dyk, an opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc by
Judge Rader, in which Judges Arthur Gajarsa and Richard Linn joined, and an opinion
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane by Judge Linn, in which Judges Rader and
Gajarsa joined). The same objections raised earlier against the information-forcing benefits
of a no-DOE system are again triggered to the extent all of these diverse opinions create
uncertainty in the eventual application of the written description requirement.
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economics, why reliance on the disclosure rules is less likely to trigger
these important concerns as extensively.
C. Reforms for Deference to the Patent Office
•	 The patentees' incentive to make their own correct determina-
tion of validity also raises serious issues for some of the present admin-
istrative law doctrines relating to the Patent Office. 259 Because the
Patent Office regulations governing a patentee's duty to disclose in-
formation material to validity provides no added incentive for the
patentee to seek out such information,260 they may be unnecessary
under either a hard-look or a soft-look system. In addition, deference
to the Patent Office's decisions on validity as being well-informed is
questionable because the Patent Office is not the lower cost provider
of information relating to validity. 261
 Moreover, to the extent decisions
on validity can be made for so-called legal reasons that are based on
facts, there is real potential for social costs relating to public choice
and administrative problems in shaping those reasons and how they
are applied.262
The costs of a hard-look system are, therefore, made worse by the
rule of deference. Information about validity over the prior art
needed to catch potentially pernicious invalid, or bad, patents is bet-
ter provided through litigation. In addition, low deference to the
agency protects good patents by leaving less room for incorrect deci-
sions on validity grounded in improper application of putative legal
rules such as utility; subject matter, and the so-called requirement for
invention, each of which has occurred in the past, as discussed ear-
lier. 263
 As a result, many of the proposed shifts towards a hard-look
system should be avoided in part because they have a greater potential
259
 These include deference on questions of law and on issues of fact. See supra note 69
(discussing administrative law aspects of the patent system).
260 Set Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that patentee has no duty to search).
251 See Kerr, supra note 69, at 127-33 (criticizing arguments for deference to the Patent
Office); see also In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-79 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reviewing reasons
for not applying enhanced deference to the Patent Office).
202 Where the statute has provided the standards against which all claims are to be
measured, a shifting in the standards on a case by case basis will return us to the bleak
result discussed supra note 227.
265 See supra Part N.A.
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for public choice and administrative problems, especially under the
present regime of heightened deference to the Patent Office. 2"
D. Reforms for Post-Issuance Procedures
Although the registration theory elucidates advantages of soft-
look registration systems over , hard-look examination systems, a num-
ber of middle-ground approaches might also be considered. These
t6+ See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (Administrative Procedures Act
requires deference to fact-finding by the Patent Office). Compare Dethmers Mfg. Co. v.
Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., dissenting)
(questioning court's decision not to give the Patent Office deference on the interpretation
of its own regulations), with Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Patent Office should not receive Chevron deference on legal questions
because "Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rtilemak-
Mg power").
Especially tinder a regime of deference, the public choice and administrative prob-
lems essentially become those associated with reward theories. Deference to the agency
simply provides incentives for individual parties to argue to the agency for policy shifts that
target a particular patent or set of patents. This is exactly the move the computer hardware
companies made during the late 1960s and early '70s to get the PTO and the Solicitor
General's Office to oppose patents on computer software. As described by Judge Rich in
dissent in In re Johnston in 1974:
I find it more significant to contemplate the identities of the troops lined tip
for battle in Benson and observe which side obtained the victory. On the one
side was the Government, against patenting programs or software, supported
by the collective forces of major hardware (i.e., computer) manufacturers and
their representative associations who, for economic reasons, did not want
patents granted on programs for their machines. On the other side was Benson
et al. and their assignee and assorted lawyers and legal groups who were in fa-
vor of patent protection for programs or software. The anti-patenting forces
won the victory ....
502 F.2d 765, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Rich, J., dissenting) (discussing Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972)), rev it on other grounds sub nom. Dann vjohnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
The majority opinion in Benson relies heavily on a 1966 report by a presidential commis-
sion on the patent system, which has been described by former Patent Office Commis-
sioner Gerald Mossinghoff:
Rlhe 1966 report of the President's Commission on the Patent System was
largely a battle between AT&T, which strongly supported the patenting of
software, and IBM, which bitterly opposed it. IBM's position as a mainframe
manufacturer and seller was that software should be unpatentable and should
be given away free of charge. AT&T, as primarily a software developer, felt
precisely the opposite.
Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of the Software Patent
Saga, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 316 n.63 (1999) (citing interview with the Honorable
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in Arlington, Va.
(Sept. 13, 1999)). As such special exceptions stack up over time, the PTO may indeed re-
semble the "circumlocution office" Dickens described supra note 227.
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may offer the informational advantages of registration while trying to
mitigate the high costs of full civil litigation through various post-
issuance procedures to challenge an issued patent but conducted be-
fore the Patent Office. Approaches that have been tried include those
called ex parte reexamination, inter partes reexamination, and inter
partes opposition. 265
Although ex parte reexamination was introduced into the patent
system in 1980 to help address the concerns about the pernicious im-
pact of issued patent claims whose validity is questionable, 266 it turns
out not to work as a cost-effective means for removing such claims.
This is because it only involves the same parties responsible for allow-
ing the claim in the first instance: the applicant and the Patent
Office. 267 In 1999, inter partes reexamination was introduced to allow
for more meaningful participation by third parties. 265
 To prevent pat-
entees from having their patents held up in perpetual reexamination,
however, this new procedure estops the third party, including the real
party in interest, from re-litigating anything that was or could have
265
 For a discussion of these various procedures, see CIIISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at
128-60.
266 I-1.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6462-63 ("Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the validity of
issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation.").
267
 The ex parte nature of the process essentially means that a third party's involvement
is limited to the initial request for reexamination. Absent meaningful involvement, this
party is not able to present effectively to the decision maker the very information relating to
validity that the registration theory shows is most likely to be in the hands of some third
party. Whatever patent claims emerge from the reexamination will again be presumed valid.
Therefore, most third parties have rationally elected to hold any pertinent information
relating to validity for later use at trial to undermine the presumption of validity that issued
with the patent. Indeed, ex parte reexamination has become a strategic tool for patentees to
strengthen effectively their presumption of validity against arguments they suspect may be
raised by competitors in litigation. If necessary, the patentee may narrow the claim during
reexamination to avoid the newly discovered art, whereas during litigation the court must
generally either hold the claim valid or invalid as written. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2001, 106 tbl.l, 119
tbls.13A—B (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001 (for
the year 2001, 150 of the 296 ex parte reexaminations were requested by third parties and
only one was an inter partes reexamination). But see Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince
Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (adopting a rule of claim interpretation that
is not all or nothing and instead merely narrows the claim scope).
268 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601-4608, 113
Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-567 to -572 (1999) (adding new sections, 35 U.S.C. §§311-318,
providing for optional inter partes reexamination procedure). For an excellent review of
the strategic concerns raised by this new procedure, see generally Robert T. Pous & Char-
les L. Gholz, Will Inter Parses Reexamination Be Embraced by Third Parties as an Alternative to
Litigation?, 7 INTELL. PROP. TODAY 37 (2000).
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been decided during the reexamination. 269 As a result, third parties
who are not yet sure they have the best argument may rationally elect
to save it for use in later litigation rather than use it and lose it.
through the more sterile process of administrative adjudication,
which does not allow for consideration of non-documentary forms of
evidence."' Inter partes opposition proceedings are used in Europe
and allow more types of evidence than the administrative procedures
available for reexamination in the United States, but these must be
filed within a short time after the patent has issued. 271
An alternative approach might be to include a special provision
for declaratory judgment jurisdiction to allow anyone who has
sufficient interest, but not necessarily reasonable apprehension of
suit, to bring an action in court challenging the validity of the pat-
269 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2000) ("[Third party] is estopped from asserting at a later
time, in any civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United
States Code, the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any
ground which the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes
reexamination proceedings. [Estoppel] does not prevent the assertion of invalidity based on
newly discovered prior art unavailable to the third-party requester and the Patent and
Trademark Office at the time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings."); American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4607 (the "1999 Act") ("Any party who requests an inter
partes reexamination under section 311 of title 35, United States Code, is estopped from
challenging at a later time, in any civil action, any fact determined during the process of such
reexamination, except with respect to a fact determination later proved to be erroneous
based on information unavailable at the time of the inter partes reexamination decision.").
Importantly, although third parties originally were not allowed under the provisions of
the 1999 Act to appeal from the Patent Office to the Federal Circuit, this right of appeal
was added in 2002. Patent and Trademark Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§ 13106, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 1899, 1900-01 (rewriting § 315(b) to expressly pro-
vide for this right of appeal to the Federal Circuit through the provisions of §§ 141-144
and rewriting § 134 to delete the express prohibition for this right of appeal); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(b) (1) ("A third-party requester ... may appeal under the provisions of section 134,
and may appeal under the provisions of sections 141 through 144, with respect to any final
decision favorable to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim
of the patent . . . ."); id. § 134(c) ("A third-party requester in an inter partes proceeding
may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences from the final decision of
the primary examiner favorable to the patentability of any original or proposed amended
or new claim of a patent, having once paid the fee for such appeal.").
"° Unlike litigation, reexamination does not allow for subpoenas, interrogatories,
depositions, live testimony, and cross-examination.
"1 See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 99(1), available at http://www.
european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (opposition
must be filed "hvlithin nine months from the publication of mention of the grant of the
European patent"); see also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN
THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, pt. 0, ch. I, at 1, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/gui_lines/index.hun (setting forth procedural guidelines for opposition
proceedings).
118	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:55
ent. 272
 This would give access to better procedures and would not
have the time restrictions of the opposition proceedings, but would
then 'subject patentees to more potential challenges. 273
 In the final
analysis, this approach begins to look most like the registration
model, which in turn raises a number of litigation conduct issues that
are discussed below.
E. Reforms for Litigation
To be sure, the balancing effect on claim scope that draws the
attention of most patent critics is imperfect and must be further ex-
plored. These critics are correct that many issued patents are held
invalid through federal court litigation. 274
 But the number of patents
held invalid has decreased over time. 275
 Critics are also correct that,
although many issued patents may be invalid but also irrelevant to the
market, 275
 some may be invalid and relevant in a bad way—through
their in terrorem effect—without ever .
 reaching litigation. 277 This
leaves alleged infringers to decide among several options: federal
court litigation to get the patent adjudicated invalid, obtaining per-
272 See Thomas G. Pasternak & Karen J. Nelson, Side Bar: Declaratory Judgment jurisdic-
tion: A Dance on the Razor's Edge, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, supra note 6, at 1043, 1043-
49 (reviewing the standard for obtaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases
under present system). Creating such a statutory cause of action to invalidate federally
issued patents would help alleviate the problems posed by the constitutional "case and
controversy" requirement from Article 111, which gave rise to the "reasonable apprehen-
sion of suit" prong of the generally applicable test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
See id. An alternative way to conceptualize this cause of action is the action to quiet tide in
the real property setting. (Thanks to Henry Smith for this suggestion).
273
 As elucidated by Lemley, one advantage in allowing more time to pass is that it allows
more information about society's interest in the patent to accrue, thereby decreasing the like-
lihood of error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which patents should receive close
attention. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (citing Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497).
274 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW. ASS'N Qf. 185, 205-07 (1998) (reporting that about
46% of all patents litigated to a final judgment on validity issues are held invalid, including
decisions on appeal and at summary judgment); Moore, supra note 122, at 390 tbl.4 (re-
porting that 33% of patents are held invalid at trial).
275 See GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
ANALYSIS 4-16 to -23 (rev. ed. 1980) (reporting invalidity numbers for the twenty-five year
period from 1953 through 1977 as averaging 65.7% for the courts of appeals and 57.8%
for the district courts); see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 274, at 206 n.53.
276
 This is the important insight explored by Lemley. See supra note 75 and accompany-
ing text.
277
 Not all potential defendants would have elected to spend the money it took to with-
stand the preliminary injunction in the one-click shopping case discussed supra notes 1-4
and accompanying text.
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mission from the patentee, or not operating in a way that allegedly
infringes. The question raised by such patents is how best to decrease
the social costs of allowing the alleged infringer to make and imple-
ment the socially optimal decision.
According to the registration theory, these social costs may be.
decreased by use of tools in the proposed registration model that are
slightly modified versions of two recent legal trends in the case law of
the present system. 278 These tools operate to decrease incentives for
strategic behavior and increase incentives for sharing information,
thereby helping ensure that the alleged infringer is able to make and
implement the socially optimal decision on the choice discussed
above. 279
The first tool arises from an important innovation in Federal Cir-
cuit case law that can be used to decrease incentives for strategic be-
havior by patentees. Despite the critics' view of the Federal Circuit as a
court that is unduly pro-patentee, the Federal Circuit has led the
charge in Rule 11 sanctions in cases such as fitdin v. United States,
278 These tools come from the general debate over the so-called 'American Rule" and
the so-called "British Rule" of litigation. As Abramowitz aptly explains:
Loser pays is often called the British rule, though variants of the British rule
exist. On the economic choice among the various alternatives, see Richard D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Reso-
lution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989); John J. Donohue III, Opting far the British
Rule, or If Posner and Shrivel' Can't Remember the Coasc Theorem, Who Will!, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); John P, Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL Sum. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts,
14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the
English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
519 (1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL •run. 399 (1973); En. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in
Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Steven Shavell, Suit, Set-
tlement, and Thal: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Edward A. Snyder & James W.
Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confivnts Theory, 6
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990); Mark S. Stein, The English Rule with Client-to-
Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Appraisa4 71 Ctit.-KENT L. REV. 603 (1995);
and Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees:
Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154 (1992).
Michael Abramowitz, Perfecting Patent Prizes 98 n.548 (2001) (working paper, available
online at http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/01-29.pdf; this footnote did not
appear in the published version of the paper, seeAbramowicz, supra note 29).
278 Neither of these tools was present during the brief window in our history when a
true registration system was in use. The registration system lasted for forty-three years,
from 1793 to 1836. Indeed, it was not until the Patent Act of 1870 that emphasis was
placed on the claim. Sec CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 19-21.
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where a discretionary ruling of no sanctions was vacated in 1997 with
instructions to award appropriate sanctions against a patentee, and its
trial and appellate counsel. 280
 Such disciplining of errant patentees also
may be achieved with other similar legal devices including 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (counsel's liability for vexatious litigation), and 35 U.S.C. § 285
(attorney fees for exceptional cases). 281 Importantly, Judin involved
the patentee's failure to conduct a pre-filing investigation on in-
fringement. Under a system like the proposed registration model,
such a disciplining device might also be extended to curb patentees'
failure to conduct pre-filing investigations on validity.
The second tool arises from a highly evolved body, of law in the
patent area that can operate to punish clients and their lawyers for
reliance on unsatisfactory opinions of counsel. 282 The standards for
opinions of counsel used by alleged infringers to insulate themselves
from liability could be applied to potential plaintiff patentees before
they are allowed to bring an action claiming liability. This would im-
prove a system like the proposed registration model by spreading the
costs of validity determinations among patentees and alleged infring-
ers. The cost-shifting effects discussed above will provide incentives
for patentees and likely infringers to exchange information about the
strength of their respective cases, thereby somewhat mitigating the
risk of duplicative expenditures. This effect is enhanced by the pat-
entee's interest in communicating with alleged infringers so as to
make the alleged infringement appear willful and thereby win treble
damages. 288
 The essential insight of the registration theory here is that
requiring the patentee also to have a gdod faith belief about patent
validity makes this interest in communicating symmetrical—potential
infringers will have a similar incentive to communicate validity infor-
mation to patentees.
Although implementation of these tools would not be a trivial
matter, it is conceptually not that difficult. The market for opinions of
counsel for both patentees and competitors that is present under the
existing system would grow. Cost-sharing techniques would likely
28a See 110 F.3d 780, 783-85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing, for abuse of discretion, a
judgment of no sanctions under Rule 11 against patentee and its counsel).
281 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
582 See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 978 F. Stipp. 184, 194-96 (D. Del.
1997) (chastising authoring counsel by name while affirming award of treble damages for
willful infringement because opinion of counsel was so plainly deficient), affil, 152 F.3d
1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
283 See Pasternak and Nelson, supra note 272, at 1043-49 (showing how such communi-
cations can be conducted without creating declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
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evolve, in which groups of interested parties could focus upon a given
patent's potential validity or infringement,284 rating organizations
might arise, 285 private bounties for pertinent prior art might be of-
fered to increase the information content of opinions, 288 and shares
in potential costs and profits of litigation could be sold. 287
Although ultimately the subject of an empirical question for fur-
ther research, the costs associated with these reform proposals are
likely to be less than the costs under the existing system—costs associ-
ated with those pernicious issued patents presumed to be valid but
likely to be held invalid if tested in court. 288 The combined effect
would be positive in several respects. For those patents that are perni-
cious under the present regime because of the litigation and in terro-
rem costs they impose on third parties, the proposed reforms would
allow third parties to bear only the lower costs associated with the
opinion markets, including costs and benefits of the fee-shifting tech-
niques. For those patents that have proper scope,289 the proposed re-
2" These might include formal trade associations or informal groupings of particular
people or firms.
285 The securities markets provide a wealth of examples of fee-based rating organiza-
tions, such as Standard & Poor's°.
2" At least one effort to offer bounties for prior art as a way to help invalidate certain
patents has been tried by a company known as BountyQuest. See, e.g., Cade Metz, Has Jeff
Bozos Patented Entail Discussion Gimps? (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://www.pcmag.com/article2
/0,4149,916103,00,asp (discussing ironic role of Amazon.com's Jeff Bezos in founding of
the BountyQuest company).
287 Each of these techniques is used to varying degrees under the existing patent sys-
tem and under the existing securities registration system upon which the registration
model is based. See supra Part II (discussing registration model and its connection to the
securities system). I am particularly indebted to Michael Abramowicz, Bernard Black, Joe
Grundfest, Arie Michelsohn, and Troy Paredes for conversations on these techniques.
"a Although the reforms are likely to lead to some duplication in the costs associated
with searching the art and writing opinions, they will avoid much of the costs under the
present system that are associated with litigation or its in terrorem effect. See supra note
277 and accompanying text (discussing these costs). In addition, a broadening of the mar-
ket for opinions of counsel for both patentees and competitors will help resolve several of
the difficult questions associated with opinions of counsel for potential infringers under
the present system. For example, the Federal Circuit recently decided to consider en bane
the role of adverse inferences when attorney-client privilege or work product immunity is
asserted to prevent disclosure of an opinion of counsel and when no opinion has been
offered in a case. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344
F.3d 1336, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The privilege and immunity problems
are sharpest when they relate to opinions by litigating counsel, and the presence of a
broader market for opinions will make it less likely that the pertinent opinion will happen
to be from litigating counsel. The problem of no opinion similarly will be mitigated as the
broader market for opinions makes them more widely and cheaply available.
288 For more on what is meant by proper scope, see supra note 222 and accompanying
text.
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forms would allow patentees to have essentially the same costs as tin-
der the present system associated with patent drafting and litigation,
except that the costs of opinions will decrease slightly (or quality im-
prove slightly) as the market for them becomes more developed. 290
Finally, one effect that may be seen as positive or negative, depending
on point of view, is that there will be a slight decrease in the value of
all patents due to the costs to patentees associated with the new need
to litigate their own affirmative validity cases. Interestingly, all of these
effects combine to yield a system that may be comparatively advanta-
geous over the present system for small players in particular for sev-
eral reasons: it will save them from the in terrorem effect of junk pat-
ents, it will save them their own patent prosecution costs, and they will
have ready access to markets to facilitate with funding or strategic
partnerships in their own litigation and commercialization efforts
when needed. Therefore, according to the registration theory, we
should adjust our present system to be more like the registration
model by adopting the proposed reforms of weakened or no pre-
sumption of validity, fee shifting, and enhanced reliance on opinions
of counsel (for both patentees and competitors) to cabin the very
pernicious effects explored by advocates of hard-look approaches. 291
29° In addition, under the full registration model, the private costs as well as the public
administrative costs associated with patent prosecution and examination would be elimi-
nated for all patents.
291
 The reforms proposed here stand in rather stark contrast to several of the recom-
mendations that the Federal Trade Commission offered in its report from the hearings
discussed supra In note 5. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1-18 (2003), at http://www.ftc .
gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). Some of the FTC recom-
mendations, such as publication of patents, make great sense under the registration the-
ory. See id. at 15-16 (Recommendation 7). Some, such as elimination of the substantive
presumption of validity, and post-grant review of patents, may be consistent with the regis-
tration model if properly implemented. See id. at 7-10 (Recommendations 1-2). But, for
the reasons explored throughout this Article, under the registration theory many should
be avoided, such as a change in the patent-obtaining rules relating to nonobviousness,
utility, and subject matter, as well as the vague concern about economic impact, a change
in the patent enforcement rules relating to notice and so-called prior user rights, in-
creased funding for the Patent Office, more involved examination, and increased defer-
ence to Patent Office decisions. See id. at 10-17 (Recommendations 3-6, 8-10).
Interestingly, the FTC recommendations very closely track data recently gathered and
reported by lain M. Cockburn of the Boston University School of Management and the
National Bureau of Economic Research and Rebecca Henderson of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Sloan School and also of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. This information was gathered from a survey conducted in the late summer of
2002 of senior intellectual property managers at large companies and was sponsored by
the Intellectual Property Owners Association. This close correlation between the recom-
mendations in the FTC report and the results of the survey is consistent with the view that
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CONCLUSION
Patent law can operate to minimize social costs, including those
typically associated with information, administration, public choke,
races for a common prize, and bargaining. The case for an alternative
model registration system helps reveal, for the first time, a normative
theory of the law and economics of the positive law patent-obtaining
rules called the registration theory. The case for an alternative model
registration system also is helpful'in showing why increased scrutiny of
patent applications would worsen, not improve, the present system's
performance.
Some may argue that a full-blown shift to registration may not be
optimal. Indeed, the present patent system already has evolved some
powerful disciplining tools that restrict patents' ability to cause many
of the social costs that prompted criticism. To the extent this effect
should be increased, it may be beneficial to dial back somewhat the
presumption of validity and increase the patentee's burdens of con-
ducting pre-filing. investigations on both infringement and validity
before bringing suit to enforce a patent.
Finally, regardless of the prescriptive aspects of this Article, the
new normative registration theory for the patent-obtaining rules of-
fered herein turns out to have more explanatory power than the re-
ward, prospect, and rent dissipation theories in the literature. The
registration theory thereby contributes to the literature by both eluci-
dating how and why these rules operate and by serving as a new lens
through which subsecfuent reforms can be judged.
some leaders in the field think the agency "got it right." But this data does not speak to
whether the agency "got it right" in the view of the same people at a different time or
other people situated differently, such as those who work in small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, or those who endeavor to approach the issue without any specific client with a pre-
sent specific agenda in mind. I am grateful to lain and Rebecca for generously sharing the
results of their data with me. Interview with lain M. Cockburn, Professor of Finance and
Economics, Boston University School of Management, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 11, 2003).
